Every conflict brings new technologies. World War I brought tanks, World War II brought tactical aviation, and the endless decolonization wars have brought asymmetric warfare. Ukraine will soon be recorded in history as the conflict where the use of drones at the front has become commonplace. Due to the uniqueness and versatility of this tool, various models have emerged, but its high efficiency has made it indispensable for all parties involved in the combat. The return of total war to the old continent confirms that drones are not trivial gadgets or whimsical ideas from engineers seeking funding. They are real weapons that will usher in what the U.S. Army calls the “Era of Competitive Parity,” a moment when technology replaces traditional combat methods. For drones, this era is expected to arrive between 2035 and 2050.The war in Ukraine symbolizes these new platforms—Ukrainians use 300 drones daily, while the Russians use double that number. However, it should be noted that before this conflict erupted, 91.3% of global drone strikes occurred in the Middle East and North Africa.We are witnessing an undeniable phenomenon, a strong trend that, like any technological innovation, is driving armed forces to rethink combat regulations to achieve interoperability between soldiers and drones (UAVs). The future of this new approach is highly anticipated. Future drones will be a clever combination of miniaturization, mobility, autonomous flight, and firepower. They will be able to return to base after completing their missions.Each type of combat zone requires different tactics, and thus different specific configurations to meet the needs of the troops using them. The direction for designing drones for future wars is yet to be determined.
Combat in the Desert
In ancient times, Salah al-Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub, leader of the Ayyubid dynasty who reconquered Jerusalem in 1187, said: “In the desert, caution is the mother of safety; the desert allows no mistakes.” The sky may generally be clear, but drones must adapt to disruptive air factors such as sand winds, dust clouds, and overheating, all of which can lead to flight failures.In the desert, drones can monitor water wells, detect suspicious camps, and enemy logistical support lines. Drones often indicate tactical retreat areas and training grounds for non-state armed groups, such as the Islamic State in the Syrian Badia desert. While these areas lack obstacles that facilitate identification processes, collateral damage can provoke strong hostility from local residents.The great advantage of drones lies in their small logistical footprint, inconspicuousness, and ability to conduct rural combat—two combat entities directly confront each other in uninhabited areas.
Operations in Arid Mountain Regions
Whether in the Hajjar Mountains of the Arabian Peninsula or in places like Jabal al-Lawz and Jabal an-Nabi Shu’ayb in Oman and Yemen, drones can establish isolated outposts in mineral-dry areas as part of light unit projections against non-state organizations. Drones can also more conveniently supply operators hidden in wadis or coordinate combat operations from forward positions.In geographically challenging areas—steep terrain and gusts that could throw drones against walls—drones can compensate for inadequate ground logistics and reduce ambush risks. They can provide powerful firepower in difficult terrains (rocky slopes, valleys) making it hard for enemies to evade attacks. Such terrain is rarely encountered tactically. In this terrain, the economy of means is crucial. The surgical strikes of drones have advantages here.Figure 1: Drone of the Houthi forces in Yemen, 2018
Source: 24.ae, “Yemen Army Shoots Down Houthi Drone in Hajjah.”
Combat in Urban Areas
In urban areas, enemy observation is hindered by buildings and population density. The camouflage of rubble complicates information, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) tasks. The Gaza War confirmed that when a modernized army exerts excessive pressure on an asymmetric entity, the front becomes overcrowded. Combatants will dig in, halting progress. Drones then lose their significance. When rumors of ceasefires or withdrawals begin to circulate in the media, the effect is to alleviate the congestion at the front. The prospect of a temporary truce means fighters will emerge from their hiding places and regain their operational capabilities, albeit limited. This puts them at risk of detection by drones, and commanders become aware of the congestion/evacuation phenomenon at the front.The space in urban areas is random. The width of streets, the winding layout, and the safety corridors defined by adjacent buildings relativize them, distancing them from drone cameras. Drones cannot prevent armed groups from optimizing the urban geographical environment. The challenge for armed organizations is how to maintain the flight of their drone fleets. While Hamas used mini-drones and unmanned aerial vehicles in the attack on October 7, 2023, these aerial operations ended under Israel’s strong counterattack. Due to the isolation of Palestinian enclaves, the aerial capabilities of Palestinian factions were wiped out with no updated capabilities. However, this failure did not diminish the intensity of the fighting faced against Israel’s well-equipped army. After months of fighting, Hamas fighters continue to resist fiercely.
Conventional Warfare
Europe believed it had escaped large-scale military bloodshed that delineated its borders. It has grown accustomed to the meticulous operations of counter-terrorism warfare—striking extreme violence with white gloves. The drone images from Ukraine’s total war evoke memories of trench warfare.Under fire cover, drone support can assess force comparisons at any time. Plasma screens have replaced the telescopes of the past. This is a significant change because soldiers already know the enemy’s position when they go to the front. The number of blind attacks has greatly decreased. Drones are helpful for both attacking and defending sides. Telegram channels broadcast the battles of both Ukraine and Russia day after day, often featuring scenes where soldiers in trenches hear commands like, “You must go out, boys. The Russian army is fifty meters away. To the left.” Surprise is the mother of all battles, but it has been compromised. Soldiers know where to go. They know where death comes from.Who would have thought a decade ago that one day soldiers would surrender, not to a person, but by waving a white flag to a drone? These are daily scenes in Ukraine. Soldiers clasp their hands together, praying to avoid being hit by drone bombs. Some follow the aircraft to the opposite trench, where they are captured, this time by flesh-and-blood soldiers. Sometimes, unmanned aerial vehicles are welcomed, bringing information and supplies. At other times, they swarm around combat personnel like a swarm of bees, swooping down on targets and destroying them.The core issue of conventional warfare is integrating drones as a basic element of artillery into tactical decision-making. For centuries of conflict, the virtues and undeniable effectiveness of artillery as the “steam engine” of combat have made it the queen of battle, and now the remaining question is how to make artillery more precise, more surgical, and less destructive, so that enemies do not hide in the rubble. Can the rain of shells not be compensated by carefully managing the overwhelming attacks? The same goes for helicopters, which embody an army’s ability to rapidly and flexibly maneuver infantry. Of course, small four-engine helicopters that can be bought online for $1,000 will never replace the AH-64 Apache helicopter, but it is a question worth noting. In wartime, drones can be used to perform various refueling tasks. The U.S. has abandoned the FARA (Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft) program aimed at updating its fleet. Even NATO is questioning the future of combat aviation and assessing the pros and cons of drones against jet fighters.
Asymmetric Warfare
Non-state armed groups are “adaptive” organizations that leverage technological innovations. As early as 2003, militants from Pakistan’s Lashkar-e-Taiba sought help from North American counterparts to acquire drones equipped with programmable global positioning systems. The Islamic State attempted to start producing suicide drones in 2017, but their project lacked feasibility; they aimed to carry a 20-kilogram payload of explosives, with a budget of $5,000 per unit. If their drones were underpowered, their propaganda efforts were undoubtedly effective. Images captured by drones were very useful for their psychological warfare: occupying space to enhance attention on social networks and traditional media. The “spectacular” visuals attracted the attention of netizens, influencing public opinion on the events.Figure 2: ISIS conducted multiple drone experiments in Syria (2017)
For a long time, drones were sporadically used, but they have gradually become dominant in the Syrian civil war. Since 2023, the Damascus army, supported by pro-Iranian militias, has been using explosive drones weekly to attack rebel organizations in rural Idlib and Hama provinces. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) has quantified this growth. From February 6 to April 19, 2024, there were 112 suicide drone attacks in northwestern Syria, resulting in 25 deaths and 26 injuries. The operations room of the “Sham Fighters” organization, Al-Fath Al-Mubin, regularly reports that the organization has shot down drones from government areas but has not provided details on the weapons used to destroy these drones.These armed organizations share a commonality with the Syrian regime in that they all have specialized military units using drones. They are eager to recruit personnel with the necessary technical expertise. Among the Syrian opposition, Uyghur militants from the Turkistan Islamic Party are reportedly providing technical expertise to the HTS organization. In December 2023, the Talbiseh Mechanization School in Homs province began hosting a 65-day training course on the use and maintenance of the Iranian-made advanced Ababil-3 and Qasef-1 drones. According to the Political Keys news site, Hezbollah instructors include drone and reconnaissance experts Hajj Abu Sadiq and Kamal Abu Haidar, head of the 127 unit drone. Russian officers occasionally also conduct drone training courses, such as teaching how to use the Russian Garbia-S anti-drone aircraft, which can intercept drones within a range of 6 kilometers.
Supplement or Replacement Weapon? High-Tech or Low-Cost?
Future wars, whether conventional, non-state, or hybrid, will involve drones. They will become the battleground for capability contests between the industrial parks of the warring parties. Their logistics lines must prove capable of executing what the military calls “capability enhancement” to influence the outcome of battles.Industrial production time differs from battlefield time. One is parameterized and standardized, while the other is explosive and elusive. To overcome this opposition, Ukrainians have established small drone assembly units and temporary factories of no more than a few dozen square meters. The aim is to be as close to the front lines as possible, which contradicts the traditional principle that equipment should be manufactured in the rear and then transported to the front. To reduce logistical transport lines, the solution could be to create nano-factories that assemble drones within a 30-foot container, transportable by truck, mobile, and always as close to combat as possible.In North Africa, Algeria and Morocco are developing national industrial projects. In Saudi Arabia, the Military Industrial Authority has set a goal that by 2030, 50% of Saudi military spending will come from Saudi suppliers. The Saqr-1 drone is the first drone entirely developed and manufactured by Saudi military industries in collaboration with the Saudi Military Industrial Authority. In the UAE, EDGE was launched in 2019 by His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the UAE. The company has become the 22nd largest arms company globally, with sales reaching $4.75 billion in 2020. The company offers dozens of aerial platforms (drones, cruise missiles).Figure 3: REACH-S is a medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) drone developed by the UAE-based technology and defense company EDGE. This drone was unveiled at the Dubai Airshow in November 2021.
In just a few years, drones have become indispensable. The new era of drones is being written before our eyes. Perhaps soon we will determine the position of drones in military operations under conditions of peace, covert warfare, or total confrontation.Their arrival may be filled with industrial uncertainties: which models will prevail? What missions will they perform? What are the logistical demands? What are the costs? But they have the tremendous advantage of reshuffling the deck. In fact, drones are breaking some outdated notions such as “weapons of the rich/poor weapons,” giving everyone the opportunity to adjust drones according to their strategic goals.Tactical operational planning has become an open imaginative space, far less serialized than established concepts like armored vehicles or nuclear deterrence. The use of drones on the battlefield remains a blank slate, and each entity can write according to its needs.Technological advantages do not guarantee military victory. Drones seem to be born for asymmetry. A homemade drone, equipped with “bombs” bought online, is enough to render a Sukhoi SU-57 useless on the tarmac.It is foreseeable that technology transfer will no longer be a bargaining chip for superpowers negotiating with emerging countries. Open spaces, the dark web, and drone capture operations on the battlefield should gradually rebalance the relationship between both sides. For example, the rising industrial vitality of Arab countries should accelerate the rebalancing of power at the negotiating table.In the future, wars cannot be won solely by drones, and without drones, armies will no longer be able to fight. This paradox will inevitably be enriched by many other paradoxes on the long and winding road to the robotization of armies.Reference Source: TRENDS Research & AdvisoryFollow for Convenient Access
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