Source: TRENDS Research & AdvisoryTransferred from: ZHUAN ZHI Intelligent Defense
Every conflict brings new technologies. World War I introduced tanks, World War II brought tactical aviation, and the endless decolonization wars led to asymmetric warfare. Ukraine will soon be recorded in history as the conflict where the use of drones on the front lines became commonplace. Due to the unique and multifunctional nature of these tools, various models have emerged, but their high efficiency has made them indispensable for all parties involved in the conflict. The return of total war to the old continent confirms that drones are not mere toys or fanciful ideas of engineers seeking funding. They are real weapons that will usher in what the U.S. Army calls the “Era of Competitive Parity,” a moment when technology replaces traditional combat methods. In terms of drones, this era is expected to arrive between 2035 and 2050.The war in Ukraine symbolizes these new platforms—Ukrainians use 300 drones daily, while Russians deploy twice as many—yet it is important to note that before this conflict erupted, 91.3% of global drone strikes occurred in the Middle East and North Africa.A strong trend is undeniably emerging, as with any technological innovation, pushing armed forces to rethink their operational doctrines to achieve interoperability between soldiers and drones (UAVs). The future of this new approach is highly anticipated. Future drones will be a clever combination of miniaturization, mobility, autonomous flight, and firepower. They will be capable of returning to base after completing their missions.Each type of theater requires different tactics, thus necessitating specific configurations to meet the needs of the troops using them. The direction for designing drones for future warfare remains to be determined.
Combat in the Desert
In ancient times, Salah al-Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub, the leader of the Ayyubid dynasty who reconquered Jerusalem in 1187, once said: “In the desert, caution is the mother of safety; the desert allows no mistakes.” The sky may generally be clear, but drones must adapt to factors that disrupt the air, such as sand winds, dust clouds, and overheating, all of which can lead to flight failures.In the desert, drones can monitor wells, identify suspicious encampments, and track enemy supply lines. Drones often indicate tactical retreat zones and training grounds for non-state armed groups, such as the Islamic State in the Syrian Badia desert. While these areas lack obstacles that facilitate identification procedures, collateral damage can provoke strong hostility from local residents.The significant advantage of drones lies in their small logistical footprint, inconspicuousness, and ability to conduct rural combat—two combat entities directly confronting each other in desolate areas.
Combat in Arid Mountain Regions
Whether in the Hajjar Mountains of the Arabian Peninsula or in places like Jabal al-Lawz and Jabal an-Nabi Shu’ayb in Oman and Yemen, drones can establish isolated outposts in mineral-dry areas, for example, as part of light units projecting against non-state organizations. Drones can also more conveniently supply operators hidden in wadis or coordinate combat operations from forward positions.In geographically challenging areas—steep terrain and gusts that could throw drones against walls—drones can compensate for inadequate ground logistics, reducing the risk of ambush. They can provide powerful firepower in difficult terrains (rocky slopes, ravines), making it hard for enemies to evade attacks. Such terrain is rarely encountered tactically. In this terrain, the economy of means is crucial. The precision strikes of drones have a significant advantage here.Figure 1: 2018 Yemeni Houthi drone
Source: 24.ae, “Yemeni Army Shoots Down Houthi Drone in Hajjah.”
Combat in Urban Areas
In urban areas, enemy observation is obstructed by buildings and population density. The camouflage of ruins complicates information, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) tasks. The Gaza War confirmed that when a modern army exerts excessive pressure on an asymmetric entity, the front lines become overcrowded. Combatants will dig in and halt their advance. Drones then lose their significance. When the media begins to circulate rumors of ceasefires or withdrawals, the effect is to relieve the congestion on the front lines. The prospect of a temporary truce means fighters will emerge from their hiding places, regaining their operational capabilities, albeit limited. This increases their risk of being detected by drones, and commanders become aware of the phenomenon of front line congestion/evacuation.The space in urban areas is random. The width of streets, the winding layout, and the safety corridors defined by adjacent buildings relativize them, distancing them from drone cameras. Drones cannot prevent armed groups from optimizing their use of urban geography. The challenge faced by armed organizations is how to maintain the flight of their drone fleets. While Hamas used micro-drones and unmanned aerial vehicles in the attack on October 7, 2023, these aerial operations ended under Israel’s strong counterattack. Due to the isolation of Palestinian territories, the aerial capabilities of various Palestinian factions were wiped out, leaving them with no updated capabilities. However, this failure did not diminish the intensity of the fighting against Israel’s well-equipped army. After months of combat, Hamas fighters continue to resist fiercely.
Conventional Warfare
Europe thought it had escaped large-scale military bloodshed that delineated its borders. It has become accustomed to the meticulous operations of counter-terrorism warfare—striking extreme violence with white gloves. The drone imagery of the total war in Ukraine evokes memories of trench warfare.With fire support, drones can assess the balance of forces at any time. Plasma screens have replaced the telescopes of the past. This is a significant change, as soldiers know the enemy’s position when they go to the front lines. The number of blind attacks has greatly decreased. Drones assist both attackers and defenders. Telegram channels broadcast daily battles between Ukraine and Russia, often featuring scenes where soldiers in trenches hear commands like, “You must go out, boys. The Russian army is fifty meters away. To the left.” Surprise is the mother of all battles, but it has been compromised. Soldiers know where to go. They know where death comes from.Who would have thought a decade ago that one day soldiers would surrender not to a person, but to a drone waving a white flag? These are the daily scenes in Ukraine. Soldiers clasp their hands in prayer, hoping to avoid being hit by drone bombs. Some follow the aircraft to the opposite trench, where they are captured, this time by flesh-and-blood soldiers. Sometimes, unmanned aerial vehicles are welcomed, bringing information and supplies. At times, they swarm around combatants like bees, pouncing on targets and destroying them.The core issue of conventional warfare is incorporating drones as a fundamental element of artillery into tactical decision-making. For centuries of conflict, the “steam engine” virtues and undeniable effectiveness of artillery have made it the queen of battle; now the remaining question is how to make artillery more precise, more surgical, and less destructive, so that enemies cannot hide in ruins. Can the rain of shells be compensated for by carefully managing the swarm attacks? Helicopters are similar; this iconic aircraft embodies an army’s ability to maneuver infantry quickly and flexibly. Of course, a small quadcopter that can be bought online for $1,000 will never replace the AH-64 Apache helicopter, but it is a question worth considering. In wartime, drones can be used for various refueling tasks. The U.S. has abandoned the FARA (Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft) program aimed at updating its fleet. Even NATO is questioning the future of combat aviation and assessing the pros and cons of drones versus jet fighters.
Asymmetric Warfare
Non-state armed groups are “adaptive” organizations that leverage technological innovations. As early as 2003, militants from Pakistan’s Lashkar-e-Taiba sought help from North American partners to acquire drones equipped with programmable GPS. The Islamic State attempted to start producing suicide drones in 2017, but their project lacked feasibility; they aimed to carry a 20-kilogram payload of explosives, with a budget of $5,000 per unit. If their drones were underpowered, their propaganda efforts were undoubtedly effective. Images captured by drones were very useful for their psychological warfare: occupying space increased attention on social networks and traditional media. The “spectacular” visuals attracted netizens’ attention, influencing public opinion on events.
Figure 2: ISIS conducted multiple drone experiments in Syria (2017)
For a long time, drones were used sporadically, but they have gradually become dominant in the Syrian civil war. Since 2023, the Damascus army, supported by pro-Iranian militias, has been using explosive drones weekly to attack rebel organizations in the rural areas of Idlib and Hama provinces. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) has quantified this increase. From February 6 to April 19, 2024, there were 112 suicide drone attacks in northwestern Syria, resulting in 25 deaths and 26 injuries. The operations room of the “Sham Fighters” organization, Al-Fath Al-Mubin, regularly reports that the organization has shot down drones from government areas but has not provided details on the weapons used to destroy these drones.These armed organizations share a commonality with the Syrian regime: they all have specialized military units for using drones. They are eager to recruit personnel with the necessary technical skills. Among the Syrian opposition, Uyghur militants from the Turkistan Islamic Party are reportedly providing technical expertise to the HTS organization. In December 2023, the Talbiseh Mechanization School in Homs province began a 65-day training course on the use and maintenance of advanced Iranian-made Ababil-3 and Qasef-1 drones. According to the Political Keys news site, Hezbollah instructors include drone and reconnaissance expert Hajj Abu Sadiq and Kamal Abu Haidar, head of the 127 unit drone program. Russian officers occasionally conduct drone training courses, such as teaching how to use the Russian Garbia-S anti-drone aircraft, which can intercept drones within a range of 6 kilometers.
Supplement or Replacement Weapon? High-Tech or Low-Cost?
Future wars, whether conventional, non-state, or hybrid, will involve drones. They will become the battleground for capability contests between the industrial parks of various combatants. Their logistics lines must prove capable of executing what the military calls “capability enhancement” to influence the outcome of battles.Industrial production time differs from battlefield time. One is parameterized and standardized, while the other is explosive and elusive. To overcome this opposition, Ukrainians have established small drone assembly units and temporary factories of no more than a few dozen square meters. The aim is to be as close to the front lines as possible, which contradicts the traditional principle that equipment should be manufactured in the rear and then transported to the front lines. To reduce logistical transport lines, a solution could be to create nano-factories that assemble drones within a 30-foot container, which can be trucked, mobile, and always as close to combat as possible.In North Africa, Algeria and Morocco are developing national industrial projects. In Saudi Arabia, the Military Industrial Authority has set a goal that by 2030, 50% of Saudi military spending will come from Saudi suppliers. The Saqr-1 drone is the first drone entirely developed and manufactured by a Saudi military industrial company in collaboration with the Saudi Military Industrial Authority. In the UAE, EDGE was inaugurated in 2019 by His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the UAE. The company has become the 22nd largest arms company globally, with sales of $4.75 billion in 2020. The company offers dozens of aerial platform references (drones, cruise missiles).
Figure 3: REACH-S is a Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) drone developed by the UAE-based technology and defense company EDGE Group. This drone was first unveiled at the Dubai Airshow in November 2021.
In just a few years, drones have become indispensable. A new era of drones is unfolding before us. Perhaps soon we will determine the role of drones in peace, covert warfare, or full confrontation within the military.Their arrival may be filled with industrial uncertainties: which models will prevail? What tasks will they perform? What are the logistical demands? What are the costs? But they have a tremendous advantage in reshuffling the deck. In fact, drones are breaking some outdated notions, such as “weapons of the rich/poor weapons,” allowing everyone to adjust drones according to their strategic goals.Tactical operational planning has become an open imaginative space, far less serialized than established concepts like armored vehicles or nuclear deterrence. The use of drones on the battlefield remains a blank slate, where each entity can write according to its needs.Technological advantages do not guarantee military victory. Drones seem to be born for asymmetry. A homemade drone, equipped with a “bomb” bought online, is enough to render a Sukhoi SU-57 useless on the tarmac.It is foreseeable that technology transfer will no longer be a bargaining chip for superpowers negotiating with emerging nations. Open spaces, the dark web, and drone seizure actions on the battlefield should gradually rebalance the relationship between both sides. For example, the rising industrial vitality of Arab countries should accelerate the rebalancing of power at the negotiating table.In the future, wars cannot be won solely with drones, but without drones, armies will no longer be able to fight. This paradox will undoubtedly be enriched by many other paradoxes on humanity’s long and winding road to military robotization.
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