Every conflict brings new technologies. World War I introduced tanks, World War II brought tactical aviation, and the endless decolonization wars led to asymmetric warfare. Ukraine will soon be recorded in history as the conflict where the use of drones on the front lines became commonplace. Due to the uniqueness and versatility of these tools, their models are emerging one after another, but their high efficiency has made them indispensable to all parties involved in the fighting. The return of total war to the old continent confirms that drones are not toys or whimsical ideas from cash-strapped engineers. They are real weapons that will usher in what the U.S. Army calls the “era of competitive equality,” a moment when technology replaces traditional combat methods. For drones, this era is expected to arrive between 2035 and 2050.The Ukraine war symbolizes these new platforms—Ukrainians use 300 drones daily, while Russians use twice that number against them—but it is worth noting that before this conflict broke out, 91.3% of global drone strikes occurred in the Middle East and North Africa.We are witnessing an undeniable phenomenon, a strong trend that, like any technological innovation, is prompting armed forces to rethink their operational doctrines to achieve interoperability between soldiers and drones (UAVs). The future of this new approach is highly anticipated. Future drones will be a clever combination of miniaturization, mobility, autonomous flight, and firepower. They will be able to return to base after mission completion.Each type of theater requires different tactics, thus necessitating different specific configurations to meet the needs of the forces that use them. The direction for designing drones for future wars remains to be determined.
Combat in the Desert
In ancient times, Salah al-Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub, leader of the Ayyubid dynasty who recaptured Jerusalem in 1187, once said: In the desert, caution is the mother of safety; the desert allows no room for error. The sky may generally be clear, but drones must adapt to factors that disrupt the air, such as sand winds, dust clouds, and overheating, all of which can lead to flight failures.In the desert, drones can monitor water wells, detect suspicious camps, and enemy logistical support lines. Drones frequently indicate tactical retreat zones and training grounds for non-state armed groups, such as the Islamic State in the Syrian Badiyah desert. Although these areas lack obstacles that facilitate identification procedures, collateral damage can provoke strong hostility from local residents.The significant advantage of drones lies in their small logistical footprint, inconspicuousness, and ability to conduct rural combat—two combat entities directly confronting each other in desolate areas.
Warfare in Arid Mountains
Whether in the Hajar Mountains of the Arabian Peninsula or in places like Jabal al-Lawz and Jabal an-Nabi Shu’ayb in Oman and Yemen, drones can establish isolated outposts in mineral-dry areas, for example, as part of a lightweight unit projection against non-state organizations. Drones can also more conveniently supply operators hidden in wadis or coordinate combat operations from forward positions.In geographically challenging places—steep terrain and gusts that could throw drones against walls—drones can compensate for inadequate ground logistics, reducing ambush risks. They can deliver powerful firepower in difficult terrains (rocky slopes, valleys) that make it hard for enemies to evade attacks. Such terrain is rarely encountered tactically. In this terrain, the economy of means is crucial. The surgical strikes of drones have an advantage here.Figure 1: Drone of the Houthi Forces in Yemen, 2018
Source: 24.ae, “Yemeni Army Shoots Down Houthi Drone in Hajjah.”
Combat in Urban Areas
In urban areas, enemy observation is obstructed by buildings and population density. The camouflage of rubble complicates information, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) tasks. The Gaza War confirmed that when a modernized army exerts too much pressure on an asymmetric entity, the front line becomes congested. Combatants will dig deep and halt their advance. Drones then lose their significance. When the media begins to frenzy over rumors of ceasefires or withdrawals, the effect is to ease the congestion on the front line. The prospect of a temporary truce means that fighters will emerge from their hiding places and regain their operational capabilities, albeit limited. This exposes them to the risk of being detected by drones, and commanders also become aware of the phenomenon of front line congestion/evacuation.The space in urban areas is random. The width of streets, the winding layouts, and the safety corridors defined by adjacent buildings relativize them, distancing them from drone cameras. Drones cannot prevent armed groups from optimizing their use of the urban geographical environment. The challenge faced by armed organizations is how to maintain the flight of their drone fleets. Although Hamas used micro-drones and unmanned aerial vehicles in the attack on October 7, 2023, these aerial operations ended under Israel’s strong counterattacks. Isolated from the world, the aerial capabilities of Palestinian factions were swept away, with no updated capabilities. However, this defeat did not diminish the intensity of the fighting against Israel’s well-equipped army. After months of fighting, Hamas fighters continue to resist fiercely.
Conventional Warfare
Europe thought it had escaped large-scale military bloodshed that delineated its borders. It has become accustomed to the meticulous operations of counter-terrorism warfare—striking extreme violence with kid gloves. The drone imagery of total war in Ukraine evokes memories of trench warfare.Under fire cover, drone support can assess the balance of forces at any time. Plasma screens have replaced telescopes of the past. This is a significant change, as soldiers know the enemy’s position before going to the front line. The number of blind attacks has drastically reduced. Drones assist both attackers and defenders. Telegram channels broadcast the battles between Ukraine and Russia day after day, often featuring scenes where soldiers in trenches hear commands like, “You must go out, boys. The Russian army is fifty meters away. To the left.” Surprise is the mother of all battles, but it has been disrupted. Soldiers know where to go. They know where death comes from.Who would have thought a decade ago that one day soldiers would surrender not to people, but to drones waving white flags? These are everyday scenes in Ukraine. Soldiers clasp their hands together, praying to avoid being hit by drone bombs. Some follow the aircraft to the opposite trench, where they are captured, this time by flesh-and-blood soldiers. Sometimes, unmanned aerial vehicles are welcomed, bringing information and supplies. At other times, they swarm around combat personnel like bees, pouncing on targets and destroying them.The core issue of conventional warfare is incorporating drones as a fundamental element of tactical decision-making in artillery. For centuries of conflict, the “steam engine” virtues and undeniable effectiveness of artillery have made it the queen of battle; now the remaining question is how to make artillery more precise, more surgical, and less destructive so that enemies cannot hide in the rubble. Can the rain of shells be compensated for by carefully managing the swarm attacks? The same goes for helicopters, which embody an army’s ability to maneuver infantry quickly and flexibly. Of course, a small four-engine helicopter that can be bought online for $1,000 will never replace the AH-64 Apache helicopter, but it is a question worth noting. In wartime, drones can be used to perform various refueling tasks. The U.S. has abandoned the FARA (Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft) program aimed at updating its fleet. Even NATO is questioning the future of combat aviation and assessing the pros and cons of drones versus jet fighters.
Asymmetric Warfare
Non-state armed groups are “adaptive” organizations that utilize technological innovations. As early as 2003, militants from Pakistan’s Lashkar-e-Taiba sought assistance from North American counterparts to obtain drones equipped with programmable global positioning systems. The Islamic State attempted to begin producing suicide drones in 2017, but their project lacked feasibility; they hoped to carry a 20 kg payload of explosives, with a budget of $5,000 per unit. If their drones were underpowered, their propaganda efforts were undoubtedly effective. Images captured by drones were very useful for their psychological warfare: occupying space increased attention on social networks and traditional media. The “spectacular” visuals attracted the attention of internet users, thus influencing public opinion on events.Figure 2: ISIS conducted multiple drone experiments in Syria (2017)
For a long time, drones were used sporadically, but they have gradually become dominant in the Syrian civil war. Since 2023, the Damascus army, supported by pro-Iranian militias, has used explosive drones weekly to attack rebel organizations in rural Idlib and Hama provinces. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) has quantified this increase. From February 6 to April 19, 2024, there were a total of 112 kamikaze drone strikes in northwest Syria, resulting in 25 deaths and 26 injuries. The “Sham Fighters” organization’s operations room, Al-Fath Al-Mubin, regularly reports that the organization has shot down drones from government areas but does not provide details about the weapons used to destroy these drones.These armed organizations share with the Syrian regime a military unit specifically dedicated to using drones. Both are keen to recruit personnel with the necessary technical skills. On the opposition side, Uyghur militants from the Turkistan Islamic Party are reportedly providing technical expertise to the HTS organization. In December 2023, the Talbiseh Mechanization School in Homs province began a 65-day training course on the use and maintenance of Iranian-made advanced Ababil-3 and Qasef-1 drones. According to the Political Keys news site, Hezbollah instructors include drone and reconnaissance expert Hajj Abu Sadiq and Kamal Abu Haidar, head of the 127 unit drone. Russian officers occasionally also conduct drone training courses, such as teaching how to use the Russian Garbia-S anti-drone aircraft, which can intercept drones within a 6 km range.
Supplement or Replacement Weapon? High-Tech or Low-Cost?
Future wars, whether conventional, non-state, or hybrid, will involve drones. They will become the battleground for the competition of capabilities between the industrial parks of various warring parties. Their logistics lines must prove capable of executing what the military calls “capability enhancement” to influence the outcome of battles.Industrial production time differs from battlefield time. One is parameterized and standardized, while the other is explosive and elusive. To overcome this opposition, Ukrainians have established small drone assembly units and temporary factories of no more than a few dozen square meters. The goal is to be as close to the front line as possible, which contradicts the traditional principle that equipment should be manufactured in the rear and then transported to the front line. To reduce logistical transport lines, a solution could be to create nano-factories that assemble drones within a 30-foot container, transported by trucks, mobile, and always as close to the fighting as possible.In North Africa, Algeria and Morocco are developing national industrial projects. In Saudi Arabia, the Military Industrial Authority has set a goal that by 2030, 50% of Saudi military spending will come from Saudi suppliers. The Saqr-1 drone is the first drone entirely developed and manufactured by a Saudi military industrial company in cooperation with the Saudi Military Industry Authority. In the UAE, EDGE was unveiled by His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan in 2019. The company has become the 22nd largest arms company globally, with sales reaching $4.75 billion in 2020. The company offers dozens of aerial platform references (drones, cruise missiles).Figure 3: REACH-S is a medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) drone developed by EDGE Group, a technology and defense company based in the UAE. The drone debuted at the Dubai Airshow in November 2021.
In just a few years, drones have become indispensable. A new era of drones is unfolding before us. Perhaps soon it will be determined what position drones will occupy in armies during peacetime, covert wars, or full confrontations.Their arrival may be filled with industrial uncertainties: which models will prevail? What tasks will they perform? What are the logistical demands? What are the costs? But they have the tremendous advantage of reshuffling the deck. In fact, drones are breaking some outdated notions, such as “weapons of the rich/poor’s weapons,” giving everyone the opportunity to adjust drones according to their strategic goals.Tactical operational planning has become an open imaginative space, far less serialized than established concepts like armored vehicles or nuclear deterrence. The use of drones on the battlefield is still a blank slate, with each entity able to write according to its needs.Technological advantages do not guarantee military victory. Drones seem to be born for asymmetry. A homemade drone, equipped with a “bomb” purchased online, is enough to render a Sukhoi SU-57 useless on the tarmac.It is foreseeable that technology transfer will no longer be a bargaining chip in negotiations between superpowers and emerging countries. Open spaces, the dark web, and drone seizure actions on the battlefield should gradually rebalance the relationships of both sides. For example, the rising industrial vitality of Arab countries should accelerate the rebalancing of power at the negotiating table.In the future, wars cannot be won solely with drones, and without drones, armies will no longer be able to fight. This paradox will undoubtedly be enriched by many other paradoxes on the long and winding road to the robotization of armies.References: TRENDS Research & AdvisorySpecial Knowledge for Convenient Access
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