This article is adapted from the WeChat public account “Liang Ning – Idle Flowers Reflecting Water (ID:cafeday)”, author: Liang Ning.
The ZTE incident has sparked a heated discussion online. Comments like “This time the chip was stuck by the US, we must develop it in a thousand years”, “Chinese chip veterans: the chip shortage is due to lack of funds”, and “Domestic operating systems need to rely on BAT”… such remarks make my heart ache.
After enduring for a few days, I couldn’t hold back any longer. I want to share a past experience of mine.
Unknowingly, I have written ten thousand words. It is divided into several parts:
Glorious Start, Difficulties of the First and Second Legs, Challenges of the System Ecosystem and Major Defeat, Reviewing Where Ark and Yongzhong Went Wrong, and Why We Cannot Develop an Operating System.
Glorious Start
From 2000 to 2002, over three years, I served as an assistant to Academician Ni Guangnan, participating in the development of the Ark CPU, Yongzhong Office, NC thin clients, and the Linux operating system.
In 2001, Ark No. 1 was launched, hailed by the media as “rewriting the history of China’s ‘no chip’ era”. The Ministry of Science and Technology’s 863 major project, the National Development and Reform Commission’s major project, and the Ministry of Information Industry’s industrial support fund all provided funding.
The technical appraisal committee for Ark No. 1 was led by the Chinese Academy of Engineering, with former president Song Jian and former vice president Zhu Gaofeng serving as the chairman and vice-chairman of the committee.
On July 10, 2001, Ark No. 1 was released, with former Beijing Vice Mayor Liu Zhihua personally hosting the press conference, and several ministers, including Minister Qu Weizhi, present to speak. Prior to this, Vice Premier Li Lanqing had listened to work reports three times.
This was the treatment Ark No. 1 CPU received at that time. The highest level of personnel and financial support was all in place.
I began participating in the Ark project in 2000. I was the principal author of the reports submitted to the 863 program, the National Development and Reform Commission (formerly the State Planning Commission), and the Ministry of Information Industry seeking support. I was also involved in the preparation of the technical appraisal meeting and the press conference.
It is hard to forget April 2001, when the first batch of chips returned. After intense debugging, we saw the CPU we designed booting up. Liu Qiang looked at me and said, “The chip is alive.” That moment is unforgettable. Perhaps, it was the most beautiful moment in that event.
Ark Technology was founded by Canadian Chinese Li Delei.
Li Delei graduated from Harbin Institute of Technology in 1977 and came to the Graduate School of the Chinese Academy of Sciences for further studies, then went to the University of Alberta in Canada for his PhD. He then stayed in Canada.
On January 8, 1997, Ark Technology’s predecessor, Baituo Lik, was registered in Beijing, mainly relying on Li Delei to introduce outsourcing business.
In 1997, after leaving Motorola, Li Delei joined Hitachi (USA) Semiconductor Company as the Director of Microprocessor Design. Correspondingly, the outsourcing business undertaken by BBT shifted from Motorola to Hitachi, mainly working on projects based on Hitachi chips. At that time, Liu Qiang had just graduated with his PhD and joined as Vice President of R&D.
In 1999, Li Delei approached Ni Guangnan, who saw that a complete technical team for CPU development had been cultivated here—something he had long desired.
The background at that time was that the Chinese IT industry, as well as Ni Guangnan himself, had been troubled by the lack of operating systems and chips with independent intellectual property rights. (18 years later, it is still the same)
At that time, Minister of Science and Technology Xu Guanhua said, “China’s information industry lacks chips and souls.” The “chips” refer to chips, while the “soul” refers to operating systems.
Thus, Ni Guangnan helped Ark find funding, government support, and all the resources needed by SMIC, without taking a penny from SMIC, holding zero shares. He was willing to give everything; he wanted a new core framework for the IT industry.
Academician Ni Guangnan told me about the Ark CPU + Linux operating system, creating a thin client NC, a “cloud + end” solution to replace the Wintel architecture. At that time, I was so excited that I clenched my fists tightly, my nails digging into my flesh.
In the past, we at Lenovo played the game designed by the Wintel alliance (the Microsoft and Intel alliance). Wintel was your top layer, and your cost and performance could only be within the space it defined.
And now, we were changing the core framework. Bringing a completely different cost and performance imagination and design space to our IT industry. This was simply amazing.
Difficulties of the First and Second Legs
Those were passionate years, with the daring Yu Cisheng serving as Deputy Director of the Beijing Science and Technology Commission. Li Wuqiang, who had attracted the attention of Deng Xiaoping, returned from the US to serve as Deputy Director of the Industrialization Department of the Ministry of Science and Technology. Everyone wanted to get things done.
We had the technology for CPUs and SoCs, the government funding was in place, and the chips were produced. The next step was to face the market and the users.
At this point, the real difficulties began.
The hardest part of making a CPU is not the development.
The first step is not that you cannot write designs like Intel, but that you cannot afford the lawsuits.
Since the Industrial Revolution, Europe has recognized and understood the value of protecting intellectual property to encourage innovation.
The US has taken it a step further. As long as it is an idea, it can be patented.
Patent protection is one of Intel’s core competitive advantages, with a large team of specialized lawyers who have registered almost all patents related to the x86 architecture.
Why is there still AMD? Intel is a shareholder of IBM, and IBM is a shareholder of AMD. That’s how it is.
So for the Ark team, the technical difficulty is not the x86 architecture, but on this road, every step you take will encounter Intel’s patents. We cannot afford the lawsuits.
Therefore, Ni Guangnan’s technical route choice was to go with the RISC architecture, focusing on embedded systems, bypassing the x86 architecture.
The second difficulty was that at the beginning of 2000, the Chinese IT industry could not only not produce CPUs but also lacked the ability to design core circuit boards based on CPUs.
At that time, there was a list of the top 100 electronic companies in China. Lenovo ranked second.
With Ni Guangnan, Song Jian, and a bunch of big shots behind me, I took the list of the top 100 electronic companies in China and found the chief engineers of each of the top 100 companies.
The dialogue was always like this:
I: “We have a CPU with independent intellectual property rights, and we also have SoC capabilities. This way, we can greatly integrate the functions you need, and your company can define the performance and size of your products more flexibly.”
Counterpart: “Oh, I’m sorry. We don’t have the capability to develop product prototypes based on a CPU. Everything is done by Intel or their design houses on public boards, and we just choose one and develop based on their public boards.”
We then realized that Intel did not just produce CPUs; it cultivated a development ecosystem based on CPUs.
The first leg is the core components.
The second leg consists of countless small design houses surrounding Intel, creating public boards, product ideas, product prototypes, differentiation, and optimization.
Then, the next leg is the companies facing the market, selecting product prototypes from design houses, commercializing them, branding, selling, and providing customer service.
However, in 2000, our top 100 electronic companies were basically all in the third leg.
So, when we produced the CPU and saw it come to life, we wanted to present it to others. There was not a single third-leg company in China that could take it.
With no other option, we had to move forward.
Thus, Ark Technology, after completing the CPU, established a hardware team to create the NC product prototype and public board. It was as if a small CPU design company had to simultaneously perform the work of a design house.
Finally, both the CPU and product prototype were ready to be handed over to a third-leg company for commercialization. Yu Cisheng decided that the Beijing government would be the first to take the plunge.
Challenges of the System Ecosystem – Major Defeat
The next problem arose. The bigger challenge was the Wintel alliance. It was difficult to bypass Intel, but even harder to break through Microsoft.
After the CPU was produced, we made the prototype and then the product. After completing the product, we found that there was no supporting software available.
For an NC public board, Ark Technology gritted its teeth and decided to do it themselves.
However, the number of software ports, adaptations, and secondary developments was not something one, ten, or even a hundred companies could handle.
At this point, Yu Cisheng initiated the “Sail Plan”, tendering nationwide for over 50 issues across 13 categories related to the Linux desktop. Browsers, OFFICE, players… solving them one by one.
Then, they did something famous in the circle—the selection of office software by the Beijing municipal government, which kicked Microsoft out. This event caused a sensation in the IT circle, leading to the resignation of Microsoft China President Gao Qunyao. Then, Henry Kissinger wrote a letter to then-Beijing Mayor Liu Qi, advocating for Microsoft and pressuring the handling of Yu Cisheng. (Who would have thought that American politicians would also serve their country’s enterprises? At that time, China had just successfully bid for the Olympics, and Kissinger’s pressure was of a big boss-level impact).
That was the winter of 2001, the biggest snow in Beijing. On that day, more than a dozen academicians jointly wrote to the Premier, advocating for Yu Cisheng. Zhang Xiaoxiang, one of the founders of China’s computer industry, a general, and an academician, was the first to sign, and Academician Ni Guangnan also signed.
It is said that Premier Zhu was moved when he saw the joint letter from more than a dozen academicians.
The 863 program, initiated in March 1986, was a joint letter from four academicians to General Secretary Deng Xiaoping. Because it happened in March 1986, it was abbreviated as 863. From then on, this became China’s key high-tech development plan. The initiation of 863 was based on a joint letter from four academicians. To protect Yu Cisheng, there were more than a dozen academicians.
I have always remembered this incident.
Later, while idling at home, watching “Saint Seiya”, I thought of the twelve golden saints who sacrificed themselves to break through the wall of sighs for a ray of light. More than a dozen academicians signed their names, with no benefit to themselves. They just wanted to protect that ray of light.
So, I am reluctant to recall this past because we failed. From then on, we became the laughing stock of many, especially Academician Ni Guangnan.
It was only ten years later, after I joined Tencent, that I learned a term—user experience. If I were to summarize this battle simply, we managed to win over the Premier but failed to secure user experience. The result was a defeat as great as a mountain.
The first fatal issue was the compatibility of Linux-based Office, including Red Office, Yongzhong, WPS, and Microsoft’s document formats. We all know that if you change the OFFICE, you cannot open historical files or files sent to you by others, which is a fatal issue.
In 2003, Yu Cisheng initiated the Qihang Plan, gathering all Office experts in China and inviting technicians from Hancom Office in South Korea and Ichitaro in Japan. Experts from China, Japan, and South Korea worked together to crack Microsoft’s document formats to enable reading and saving.
The results were poor.
In addition to document formats, the user experience of other software was unsatisfactory, leading to widespread complaints. Users generally demanded a return to Wintel. Thus, we failed.
Later, the Ark CPU development was halted. Yongzhong went bankrupt and was liquidated. Those tens of thousands of NC units that the government bought to support an industry have probably long been sold as scrap metal.
Years later, Bill Gates publicly revealed the document formats of Office. When I saw this news, I felt as if my face had been slapped by a door.
I watched the video of this person, who joked at his Harvard graduation saying, “Dad, I finally got my diploma!” This person, who retired to do charity, would choose a sick boy as the cover of Time magazine while on duty as an editor. I wondered if this person was an angel or a devil.
He has indeed done many good things. However, he has crushed the entire Chinese general software industry.
Being a Small Businessman, Secular Success is Quite Easy
In 2003, I left Academician Ni’s alliance, feeling very sad, thinking of myself as a deserter in a great sacrificial battle.
In 2008, when I started a website, one night a kid was bored and installed the latest version of the Red Hat desktop. As I walked by, I saw it at a glance, stopped, and started using it. Trying this and that, I was overwhelmed with emotion, almost crying. If in 2002, the desktop had this level, this large group of people would not have lost so badly.
After leaving Academician Ni, I was in a slump for more than a year. During that time, many people approached me for work, mostly for two types of tasks: “I have a product I want you to help me build a channel in China” or “I have a product, can you help me with government relations?” I no longer wanted to do either of these. But apart from that, I didn’t know how to do anything else.
Later, I joined Wang Lu. I told him: “The things I learned over the years are only useful for working on a particularly large system. I want to learn some practical skills that can support my family here.”
Later, Wang Lu made me the general manager of a digital magazine that was about to close.
After leaving Wang Lu, I called Lei Jun. I said, “I want to get a job.” Lei Jun asked me to find him in his office. He asked me what I was doing. I showed him the magazine in my hand and said I was the general manager of this magazine.
Lei Jun said: “Why do you want to do this?”
I said: “I can’t find a job.”
Lei Jun said: “But why do you want to do this?”
I said: “To learn some small skills that can support my family.”
Lei Jun said: “Then you can do this.”
The general manager of the magazine was essentially advertising sales.
With my experience writing major project proposals worth hundreds of millions for the National Development and Reform Commission, writing a proposal for an advertisement worth three to five hundred thousand should not be difficult. The first time a client asked for a kickback, I couldn’t confirm if that was asking for money. But I thought about it and decided to give it a try.
I took this client out for a meal and handed him an envelope. During the meal, both of us were absent-minded, not really there to eat or communicate. Then I handed him the envelope, and without any hesitation or polite refusal, he smoothly put it in his pocket and left.
That night, I cried for a long time.
In the past, I woke up early and worked hard for friendship and honor.
From then on, what I did had no honor at all; I was just a small businessman pulling ads for kickbacks.
Later, I learned to build websites, then sold the website to Tencent, and then… ten years passed. In the eyes of the world, I am considered successful.
Academician Ni Guangnan is Still Persisting
In early 2014, I left Tencent. After completing the formalities, I sent a WeChat message to Academician Ni Guangnan: “Teacher Ni, I have left Tencent.” Teacher Ni replied, “Come see me, I have something for you.” So I went to see him.
In 2013, during government procurement, I consulted Academician Ni Guangnan regarding strategies for Win8.
Academician Ni Guangnan directly wrote to General Secretary Xi, bluntly suggesting: “Develop a domestically controllable operating system based on a shared software architecture.”
The main text of Academician Ni Guangnan’s report was less than 800 words, and the General Secretary handwrote over 200 words of comments. “The importance of core technologies and information infrastructure such as computer operating systems is evident. We must solve the issues of being constrained by others in some key technologies and equipment as soon as possible.”
More than ten years have passed, and after experiencing failures and criticisms, Academician Ni has still persisted.
When I visited him in early 2014, he was still wearing the same cotton coat from 2001.
Academician Ni still trusts me, directly involving me with his core team to discuss how to promote a domestically controllable operating system in mobile scenarios.
Ten years have passed. Google and Apple have defeated Microsoft. Microsoft is still strong, but the PC era has ended.
Yu Cisheng and Li Wuqiang have both retired. Li Delei is missing, and Yongzhong has gone bankrupt. Liu Qiang left Ark in 2005 to establish Junzheng and went public in 2010. Now, many chips used in products like the 360 camera and Xiaomi watch are made by Liu Qiang. The investment Academician Ni Guangnan made in Ark CPU in 2000 has still yielded results.
Huawei has purchased ARM licenses and produced Hisilicon chips.
Xiaomi has also invested billions in developing the Pinecone processor.
Just like more than ten years ago, as long as we resolve the intellectual property issues, choose the right technical route, find capable people, and invest, CPUs/chips can be produced.
What remains unresolved is still the operating system. The gap in the ecosystem is still large.
Back then, we could bypass Intel but could not overcome Microsoft.
Today, we can bypass ARM but cannot produce Android.
That period, following Academician Ni, I attended several high-end meetings. Surrounded by dignitaries, they still spoke the same language as fourteen years ago. I found that I had changed. In similar settings, my feelings today are completely different from those fourteen years ago.
In the past ten years, I have not reported to any leader, nor have I spent a minute speculating on their intentions.
I only need to continue doing one thing: understanding user needs and optimizing user experience.
This is a completely different direction from working in a system.
For the second time, I left Academician Ni. At that time, I believed I could judge directly that this matter could not be accomplished.
That is to say, if the approach does not change, perhaps we could still obtain a lot of money, many resources, get land approved, and build buildings, but we could not create the ecosystem for the operating system.
Android has three components:
1. The continuously iterating and optimizing Android system itself
2. The various applications based on Android that everyone is now very accustomed to: WeChat, business, games, life, entertainment…
3. Countless teams globally, continuously creating new applications based on Android, constantly enriching and optimizing this ecosystem.
Fifteen years ago, the migration of desktop office applications had already caused that group of warriors to fail. Now, the number of application migrations is far greater than in the past, with an even more extensive and prosperous ecosystem. Still the same system, still the same routine. Facing a larger battle, there is no chance of winning.
Leaving a company is completely different from leaving a person; no longer accompanying this person and supporting his ideals is a completely different feeling.
I was happy when I left Lenovo and Tencent.
But I have always felt deeply guilty for leaving Academician Ni for the second time.
At that time, he was already 75 years old. This was his lifelong dream. I was his favored and trusted disciple. I did not help him.
Reviewing Ark and Yongzhong
Today, looking back, what did Ark and Yongzhong do wrong more than ten years ago?
First, Ark Technology is Li Delei’s personal company. The purpose of Li Delei in starting this company was to make money, so his choices were naturally based on what could make money.
Ni Guangnan saw the talent pool and know-how of this company and leveraged all his connections and credibility, hoping to condense Ark’s talent pool and know-how into a sustainable IT system foundation through a project.
Where did this go wrong?
It is what I mentioned in my “30 Lectures on Product Thinking” regarding organizational principles.
Top organizations are based on deep emotions,
First-class organizations share a common belief,
Second-class organizations share common interests,
Third-class organizations share common rules.
So, using this organizational principle, let’s see why Li Delei was untrustworthy.
First, there was no deep emotional connection between Li Delei and Ni Guangnan. There was certainly no common belief. There was also no common interest.
Li Delei’s interest was to maximize personal income.
Ni Guangnan’s interest was to condense Ark’s talent pool and know-how into a sustainable IT system foundation.
Thus, the basis for their cooperation was that as long as Ni Guangnan could continuously meet Li Delei’s interest demands, they could “share common rules”. In other words, once Li Delei was dissatisfied with the benefits provided by Ni, the rules would immediately fall out of alignment.
But fundamentally, Li Delei and Ni Guangnan were not an organization capable of collaborating on major projects and bearing significant pressure.
If Ark’s problem was organizational foundation, Yongzhong’s organizational core was actually quite good. Zhang Yanqing and Cao Can not only shared common interests and beliefs but were almost deeply connected. The problem with Yongzhong was product definition and user experience.
Still referring to my “30 Lectures on Product Thinking”, I discussed the user value formula in one of the lectures. This formula was actually proposed by Yu Jun, and I strongly agree with it.
User Value = (New Experience – Old Experience) – Replacement Cost
To acquire a user, the tool relied upon is user value. If the value obtained by the user is sufficiently high, they will migrate. For example, hundreds of millions of users smoothly migrated from SMS to WeChat.
What does it mean to acquire a user? We relied on government orders to install Yongzhong Office on tens of thousands of government employees’ computers. Did we acquire this user?
Let’s calculate the user value of Yongzhong Office.
If Microsoft’s Office software has a user experience score of 90 and a price experience score of 50, the old experience brought by Microsoft’s Office software is calculated as 45.
Yongzhong Office has a user experience score of 70 and a price experience score of 90, which gives it a new experience score of 63. Yongzhong Office can claim to provide a better new experience than Microsoft.
However, there is also the replacement cost. The user’s replacement cost includes brand recognition, acquisition cost, learning cost, and usage cost, which includes timely help when encountering problems during use.
We know that Bill Gates has long been the world’s richest man, and Microsoft’s brand, channel, product maturity, customer service system, and the user sharing available online, along with the document format compatibility issues I mentioned earlier, all contribute to a high replacement cost for users. Let’s estimate the replacement cost at 20.
Thus, user value = new experience 63 – old experience 45 – user replacement cost 20 = -2.
This means that even if we give Yongzhong Office high scores and low scores to Microsoft, ignoring the user’s migration cost, users have not gained any new value. This fundamentally fails to create the willingness to migrate.
At the same time, we need to note that government procurement is paid by the unit. Therefore, the actual users have no perception of the price experience.
So, if we score based on user perceived experience:
Yongzhong’s user value = 70 – 90 – 20 = -40.
In fact, it is even lower than this score.
By binding users with “patriotism”, the user value decreased so much that users had no choice but to complain and find various reasons to return to their previous comfortable situation.
Cao Can defined Yongzhong’s core competitiveness as “data integration”.
He analyzed that “Microsoft Office software has a significant flaw: Word, Excel, and PowerPoint are three independent applications that cannot be integrated.”
If document processing, electronic spreadsheets, and slide production could be integrated into the same program, then when users modify data in the document, the corresponding data in the spreadsheet and slides would automatically update, eliminating the need for users to find and modify each necessary place.
Wow! For a piece of data to be referenced in Word, Excel, and PowerPoint simultaneously is a very, very low-frequency application scenario, isn’t it?
Looking back over the past five years, I have not needed “data integration” even once.
In Yongzhong, Cao Can was the undisputed product core, and Zhang Yanqing supported him immensely. The entire Yongzhong team was united in their efforts. Academician Ni praised Yongzhong’s collective fighting spirit.
(At that time, while waiting for a bus, Academician Ni said, “Shall I buy you an ice cream? How about strawberry?” Sigh, for that ice cream, I feel guilty for leaving him twice.)
Returning to Yongzhong, the problem was that they did not pay enough attention to enhancing user experience in the most frequently used scenarios.
Instead, they spent their core efforts on a scenario that a user might use once every five years, feeling proud of it.
I saw Yongzhong’s outcome and Cao Can’s recollections online. Cao Can placed the blame on Tang Min and others who acquired Yongzhong.
But it shouldn’t be. Yongzhong went bankrupt due to a debt of 10 million RMB.
10 million RMB is just the price of an ordinary house in Beijing. If the product’s user value was clear and positive, raising 10 million RMB would not be difficult.
Yongzhong had a solid organization that could bear pressure together, had a good start, and produced 70-80% of the product. But they still failed.
In Cao Can’s recollection article, there was self-praise for his innovation points and resentment towards competitors, but there was no complete user scenario, user experience map, or user value.
Pony Ma said: Product managers cannot fight for their own self-esteem.
Changing the Assessment Method of the System is Necessary to Cultivate an Innovative Ecosystem
Having reviewed my understanding of the core failure points of Ark and Yongzhong, we indeed made mistakes in organizational design, user insight, user experience, and other aspects. However, the failure of a major government project support does not mean that we have not had chips and operating systems in the past ten years; this is not our fault.
Let’s further explore why, after twenty years, we have countless skyscrapers, and many counties are built like Beijing, and we have the new four great inventions.
But we still do not have an operating system.
In the international space of the information society, China is a network power. However, this network power is built on Microsoft’s Windows and Google’s Android.
In early 2014, I accompanied Academician Ni to a seemingly high-end “Mobile Operating System Ecosystem Seminar”.
I said, if our country really wants a “mobile operating system ecosystem”, it is quite clear and straightforward: the state should invest money, plant seeds, and pour 100 billion into the market every year for five consecutive years, allowing for large-scale failures.
At the meeting, officials then discussed how to acquire land from the science park to create high government investment assets to ensure investment results…
I was speechless. Then I withdrew.
Why can we build houses and launch satellites but cannot produce operating systems? This is actually the same reason Lenovo sold the Wintel framework PCs to become the global number one but could not take the next step to develop core technologies or embrace the internet and mobile internet. The reason is the same.
It is the collective mindset of the system, which relies heavily on certainty. Within a framework of certainty, internal talents are highly competitive and cannot tolerate failure. The result is excessive management. Everyone takes pride in certainty, certainty, and more certainty. Uncertainty is fear, panic. Failure is shame, a stain. Innovation and creativity grow alongside uncertainty and failure.
This is the fear and intolerance of failure in Lenovo and our system.
As for market-oriented enterprises, they follow users and the market.
In 2014, Academician Ni once again promoted the mobile operating system and asked me to discuss with Tencent whether WeChat could be ported to a domestically controllable operating system.
I immediately contacted Tencent’s big shots and mentioned the General Secretary’s instructions, then asked if WeChat could be ported. The response from Tencent was as I expected: We follow the users. Without user volume, we cannot arrange work.
Therefore, an article titled “Domestic Operating Systems Need to Rely on BAT” suggests relying on publicly traded companies that need quarterly financial reports to support stock prices? Don’t be ridiculous.
How Much Money Did Ark and Yongzhong Receive?
Today, looking back at what is seen as a major failure, costing countless heroes, how much money was invested in the Ark and Yongzhong projects?
“Ark No. 3” research and development funding was allocated 15.38 million RMB. According to the budget requirements of the “863 project”, the salary portion for researchers cannot exceed 15%, which is about 2.3 million RMB. Therefore, the nearly 60 engineering personnel involved in the Ark company’s research and development would only receive a monthly salary of over 2,000 RMB.
According to the relevant policies of the Ministry of Science and Technology regarding the use of research funds, funds for salaries, labor fees, and unit commissions cannot exceed 5% in public institutions, 10% in research transformation enterprises, and 15% in enterprises. If the “863 project” were to be done by universities, it would be normal to allocate 15% of the budget for researchers’ bonuses, but for a company to do a project, allocating 15% for salaries is definitely insufficient.
Li Delei said the money was too little and not enough to pay salaries. He was mocked by the “863” experts. This expert explained that the funding for chip projects mainly goes to wafer fabrication and EDA tools, while personnel salaries are just a small part.
Ignoring the market’s talent competition and market pricing, centered around maintaining the rules set by officials. I am required to do this. If you cannot do it, you are wrong.
Ignoring the market and human nature.
People like Liu Qiang and me can easily do well if we do easy things. If we find people like us to do the hardest things and pay the least, why do our officials think this is reasonable?
As for Yongzhong?
Cao Can stated: From 2000 to 2008, Yongzhong Technology received government funding of over 80 million RMB, with 152 million RMB invested in product research and development. During the same period, product sales revenue was only over 50 million RMB, and the company accumulated losses of over 50 million RMB.
This is the largest investment in CPU and Office in our country.
Isn’t it something that a bunch of 90s investment fund managers would laugh at?
We have the new four great inventions: high-speed rail, QR code payment, shared bicycles, and online shopping. Just think about how much money was burned to create these new four great inventions?
There is no need to recall the battles of the group wars or the ride-hailing subsidy wars. In 2018, Mobike, which left its peers behind, burned 10 billion RMB as a bicycle company.
A single company burned 10 billion RMB, shared bicycles burned hundreds of billions, and the result is that every city can ride shared bicycles.
How much money was burned for China’s independent intellectual property CPU + operating system + core office software? Including all the NC units that turned into scrap metal back then.
20 billion, is that possible?
This matter, this number, has become a terrifying memory. Then, all companies and officials were scared to death.
Years later, the state paid a fine for ZTE. An 800 million USD fine.
However, this money was paid by the state, and the officials made no mistakes. This is our system’s choice.
Those who will make mistakes are no longer willing to take risks. Ten years ago, Li Wuqiang stood up with the attitude of not fearing to lose his “hat”. There are only a few such “fools” in the past ten years. Moreover, a few fools have also failed. A lesson from the past.
Whose Delusion, Whose Shame
Therefore, I say the government needs an operating system. What is needed is not to invest in a team but to burn money to create an ecosystem. It is about burning money. Tolerating failure.
During the Warring States period, King Zhao of Yan built a golden platform by the Yi River to recruit talents from all over the world, offering a piece of gold on-site to those with abilities. The market and human nature are like this; why deceive ourselves?
While a bicycle company burned 10 billion, a country’s operating system, a complex and large ecosystem, requires countless people to participate. Are you planning to invest in a few companies with a small amount of 15 million and then go against Android?
Whose delusion is this?
Why is it said that challenging Android is harder than challenging Microsoft?
Because today, the ecosystem based on Android is larger, more prosperous, and more frequent.
In business, life, and entertainment, an individual’s and a company’s digital space can almost be completed using a mobile phone. Our dependence on mobile scenarios far exceeds that of desktops.
How much did Microsoft invest in OFFICE?
Microsoft is a publicly traded company, and its financial reports are public. In the 2016-2017 fiscal year, Microsoft’s annual R&D investment was 12.4 billion euros, over 100 billion RMB.
Microsoft invested over 100 billion RMB in R&D in one year. I do not know how much of this was used for OFFICE. However, in any case, Yongzhong spent 152 million RMB over eight years and failed, becoming a major stain. I do not know whose delusion this is, whose shame.
More than 18 years ago, Academician Ni Guangnan and I sighed: “Whether in a pure planned economy or a pure market economy, we can produce great things.”
More than 18 years later, in 2018, Academician Ni, now 79 years old, is still advocating for China’s independently controllable chips and operating systems.
In the eyes of the world, he is a Don Quixote. Expelled from Lenovo by Liu Chuanzhi, the major projects he promoted were not completed. He has been used by one person after another for this dream.
And he knows he is being used, yet he still risks his entire reputation to continue trying and striving.
Those who do nothing and make no mistakes ridicule him: “Out of touch with reality”, “Always being deceived”, “Still continuing to do it after being deceived”…
And everyone continues to pay, directly or indirectly, for the “no chip” situation.
I do not know whose delusion this is, whose shame.
Conclusion
This past is filled with passion, loss, doubt, and guilt, so I am very reluctant to recall it.
Today, taking this opportunity, I want to express my thoughts and write it down.
I did not show this to Teacher Ni because he is a true gentleman. If I showed it to him, he would definitely avoid mentioning this person and consider that person.
Last night, I suddenly wanted to write, and this morning at 6:00, I could no longer sleep, so I got up and wrote ten thousand words in one go. Perhaps I wrote everything that should and should not be written. This is my personal perspective, my personal narrative.
Some years ago, I went to Changbai Mountain with Hao Xilong and a few of his friends. We stayed overnight at a farmhouse at the foot of the mountain. Surprisingly, I met Liu Qiang there. After parting from Ark, I never expected to meet him again in such a place after so many years. The once heroic youth now has gray hair. At that time, he had already founded Junzheng. The past of Ark is something everyone is reluctant to mention. So many good comrades, we have scattered without saying goodbye.
However, the attempts, efforts, mistakes, and sacrifices that occurred have happened.
This article is placed on the internet to express my gratitude and best wishes to the comrades and teachers who fought alongside me, supported each other, complained to each other, and did not have a proper farewell.
*The article represents the author’s independent viewpoint and does not reflect ZEALER’s position.
