(Source: Jimeng AI)
Friends, today we continue discussing the topic of AI chips.
According to “Observer Network,” on August 22, foreign media cited sources saying that NVIDIA has informed suppliers such as Anke Technology and Samsung to suspend production related to the H20. Previously, on July 31, to maintain the network and data security of Chinese users, the National Internet Information Office interviewed NVIDIA, requesting explanations and relevant proof regarding the security risks of backdoors in the H20 computing power chips sold to China. Mr. Gao Zhikai, Vice Chairman of the China Center for International Economic Exchanges, made some significant suggestions on this topic, one of which is to suggest that the Chinese government sign a formal agreement with companies like NVIDIA—ensuring that their products sold in China do not have so-called backdoors or other related functions, and that they need to pay 15% of their revenue in China as a security deposit.
Next, let’s discuss the feasibility and necessity of the H20 chip and the “15% security deposit” scheme in the current competitive landscape of AI technology.
01
——H20 Chip: A Disguise of “Carrot” or “Stick”?
First, we need to clarify what the H20 actually is. In simple terms, it is a “special edition” of NVIDIA’s flagship product, the H100, or rather, a “stripped-down version.” To circumvent the increasingly stringent export controls from the U.S. Department of Commerce, NVIDIA has gone to great lengths. Let’s look at the data: the computing power of the H20, especially its FP16 (half-precision floating point) performance, is only about one-fifth to one-third of that of the H100. This is a precise cut. Interestingly, it surpasses its older brother, the H100, in memory capacity (96GB HBM3) and bandwidth (4.0TB/s) (80GB HBM3;3.4TB/s).
What is this operation? It’s like a sports car where the engine has been replaced with a smaller displacement, but the fuel tank and pipes have been enlarged. This design philosophy exudes a sense of “cunning”—it makes you unable to run fast but allows you to handle (process) more data. Behind this, I believe there may be a dual strategic intent from the U.S. regarding “technological strangulation” and “data surveillance” against China. What do you think?
“Technological strangulation” is an overt strategy. Limiting computing power is to slow down China’s speed in training top large models, making you always wear a pair of “custom-made” “slow shoes” in the AI arms race. From the “Chip and Science Act” to the continuously updated “Export Administration Regulations,” the core purpose is to maintain the U.S.’s absolute advantage in high-end computing power, which is already laid out on the table.
On the other hand, “data surveillance” is a more covert line of attack. Chips, as the foundation of the digital world, if they have “backdoors” reserved, are like embedding a digital-age Trojan horse in your information building. We cannot forget the bloody lessons of the “PRISM” incident, which eloquently proved that, in the face of national interests, tech giants can also become the “ears” and “eyes” of intelligence agencies. The H20 chip’s self-harm in computing power, while retaining strong data throughput capabilities, raises further questions: is it creating hardware convenience for some large-scale data collection or monitoring? “Special supply” chips may come with “special supply” risks; what seems like a concession may hide deeper layouts.
02
——15% Security Deposit: A Potent Remedy Against Risks?
In the face of such potential, invisible risks, what should we do? Traditional firewalls and antivirus software may be like paper windows against hardware-level backdoors.
Suppose we require suppliers to pay a “security deposit” of 15% of the contract amount when purchasing AI chips from American companies. If it is later confirmed that the chip has malicious backdoors or security vulnerabilities causing losses to the Chinese side, this money would serve as compensation. This seems to achieve the goal of curbing “malicious attacks” at the supplier level.
So, is Mr. Gao Zhikai’s suggestion of a 15% security deposit feasible? Let’s analyze it together.
1. Legal Basis and International Practices:
First, internationally, there are indeed few precedents for directly establishing a “security deposit” for hardware products. Many friends may mention the case of Boeing, where Boeing paid hefty fines due to the 737 MAX crash, but this was more of a punitive compensation and criminal settlement after the fact, rather than a preemptive risk deposit.
However, the absence of precedent does not mean it is unfeasible. In another high-risk area—the financial derivatives market, the margin system is a common international practice. Both parties in a transaction must pay a margin to hedge against default risk. This logic can be completely borrowed. We can argue that in the larger “field” of digital sovereignty and national security, chip suppliers should also guarantee the “safety” of their products. Legally, although our current “Cybersecurity Law” does not explicitly provide for this, it can completely be established as an innovative procurement clause or clarified in the future “Artificial Intelligence Law.”
2. Operational Challenges and Negotiations:
Of course, the operational difficulty is not small. Who will determine what constitutes a “security incident”? Is it a malicious backdoor or an unintentional bug? Who will hold the deposit? What is the process for triggering compensation? All of these require an extremely precise system design. Moreover, will giants like NVIDIA accept this? This will inevitably lead to a fierce commercial and political negotiation.
03
——Building a Comprehensive Defense System—
The security deposit policy, even if it can be implemented, is only one part of the security defense system. As the saying goes, one hand cannot clap alone, and a single tree cannot form a forest. To truly safeguard China’s AI security, economic security, and national security, we must build a comprehensive defense system composed of technology, law, and administrative measures.
Technical Self-Inspection—Our “Mirror of Truth”: This is the first and also the most hardcore defense line. Establish a national-level chip security testing center to conduct “pixel-level” reverse engineering and security audits on all key chips entering the Chinese market. Whether it is hardware trojans, logic bombs, or firmware backdoors, they must be exposed under our “fire eye and golden eye.”
Legal Action—Our “Sword of Justice”: Once a problem is discovered, we must initiate a thunderous legal accountability process. We can explore establishing a class action system for the technology security field. Once it is confirmed that a certain chip has security violations, all Chinese companies that purchased that chip can join the lawsuit and seek hefty compensation. This is not only to recover losses but also to serve as a strong deterrent against potential wrongdoers.
Prohibition in Key Areas—Our “Moat”: This is a red line that cannot be crossed. In core areas related to national security, such as military defense, core government departments, major scientific research projects, and critical information infrastructure, foreign chips with potential risks must be clearly prohibited. In these areas, we must and can only use chips that we have developed ourselves and are completely controllable, such as Huawei’s Ascend series.
Ultimately, true security is not based on others’ promises but is built on our own strong capabilities and meticulous systems.
04
——Conclusion
Brothers, from the H20 chip controversy to the idea of a 15% security deposit, what we see is not only a commercial game but also a profound contest between major powers in the digital age. This covert battle, devoid of gunfire, concerns the data security of each of us and the lifeblood of our country’s future development.
Proposing an idea like the “security deposit” may seem a bit ahead of its time, even considered “fantastical.” But history tells us that in the face of new challenges, new ideas are needed. Rather than passively responding and worrying, it is better to proactively design rules and set agendas.
Understanding the complexity of this game is also a small step for each of us in the workplace and for entrepreneurs to enhance our cognition. Sharing your thoughts and ideas to let more people understand the intricacies of this chessboard is also a form of power aggregation. After all, in an increasingly interconnected world, helping others see the direction is also paving the way for ourselves.
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