90% of imported chips have ‘backdoors’!
NVIDIA H20 is just the tip of the iceberg!
From Qualcomm being exposed for collecting user data, to NVIDIA being questioned for security vulnerabilities, to foreign legislation requiring exported chips to have remote lockout capabilities—backdoors are both a technological product and a political tool.
Hello everyone, I am Uncle Rocket. Why do chips have ‘backdoors’, how are they left, and how can we prevent them? Today, I will explain it all to you.
First, a ‘backdoor’ is like when you buy a house, but the developer secretly keeps a key. Some keys are indeed a technical necessity. During the design and debugging phases of a chip, some test modes and debugging interfaces are reserved to help engineers troubleshoot issues and fix defects. This is similar to how car manufacturers leave a hidden menu in new cars to check engine status and adjust parameters. The problem is that many of these functions are not documented when the product is mass-produced, and customers may not even know they exist. If someone has access to these hidden interfaces, combined with network access, they could potentially enter your device remotely.
Some ‘backdoors’ are necessary for security management. Manufacturers may embed remote management features to activate or deactivate certain modules of the chip or update firmware. This is common in servers, graphics cards, and CPUs, and can often run before the operating system starts, with a privilege level higher than the system kernel. This is done for maintenance convenience, but if maliciously exploited, it becomes an ‘invisible backdoor.’
The remaining ‘backdoors’ are primarily driven by political factors. For example, some U.S. lawmakers proposed the “Chip Security Act,” requiring AI chips exported to have location verification and remote lockout capabilities, essentially putting ‘electronic shackles’ on the chips. Once a chip enters a country or region they do not want to sell to, it can be remotely bricked. NVIDIA’s special version of H20 for China has been suspected of having a ‘backdoor’ in this context. Once such requirements are written into law, manufacturers have no choice but to comply—otherwise, they cannot survive in their domestic market.
So, what can the ‘developers’ do with these ‘backdoors’?
First is data theft. If a backdoor can access the chip’s storage space, it could directly steal your files, passwords, research results, or even confidential data.
Next is gaining control over the device. Imagine you bought a high-performance server running critical business operations. One day, a manufacturer or a government agency sends a command, and the device is remotely locked down, leaving you unable to even power it on.
Furthermore, it undermines system security. Backdoors often operate at a level lower than the operating system, making them undetectable by antivirus software and unblocked by firewalls. Once an intruder gains such access, they can do as they please—disable security features, implant malware, or eavesdrop on cameras and microphones, all silently.
Even more frightening is that the existence of backdoors can be exploited by third parties—what was originally designed as a ‘key’ for manufacturers can become a lock-picking tool once stolen by hackers.
This is why we need to remain highly vigilant about ‘backdoors.’
To prevent this, we can only do the following: First, complete physical isolation—devices involved in confidential or critical business should not connect to the internet, cutting off all possible remote access channels. Many confidential units even require that USB keyboards and mice cannot be used, and only PS/2 interfaces are allowed, as USB can transmit data bidirectionally and can easily be modified into eavesdropping tools. Second, domestic substitution. Some risks come from technological dependence; if critical chips rely entirely on imports, it is equivalent to handing over life and death power to others. The rise of domestic AI chips like Huawei’s Ascend, Cambricon, and Biren Technology aims to reduce this passivity in high-performance computing. Third, security testing and auditing. For imported chips that must be used, methods such as firmware reverse engineering and hardware reverse engineering can be employed to check for suspicious functions. Although this is costly and difficult, it is a necessary investment in defense, research, and other fields. Finally, regulations and negotiations. Since others can use ‘security’ reasons to require you to prove your innocence, we can also demand that they provide technical details and accept security audits. Time, procedures, and negotiations can all become bargaining chips.
Ultimately, the competition in technology is not just a contest of computing power, but a game of security and trust. What we need to do is not to fear backdoors, but to have the ability to close others’ backdoors while keeping our own keys.