01
A “100% + 15%” bill has amused the global market.
Last week, Washington quietly issued a new bill:
1. A 100% tariff on any non-American advanced chips sold in the U.S.;
2. Any American chip company exporting to China must pay a 15% “technology royalty” to the Department of Commerce.
Upon hearing the news, social media exploded into three factions:
• The Spectators: “The Americans are playing poker with tariffs, going all in with their cards face up.”
• The Actuaries: “Collecting money twice, GDP gets another decimal point.”
• The Domestic Substitution Advocates: “Thanks to the U.S. for handing us the knife, domestic chips welcome their window of opportunity.”
02
Translating ‘double dip’ into business language means a precise “moat + bloodsucker” strategy.
First, let’s look at the “100% import tariff.”
It is not merely trade protection but a reverse operation of “market for technology”:
• Blocking TSMC, Samsung, SK Hynix, and other non-American advanced processes from entering the market, forcing them to build factories in the U.S.;
• Building factories requires using American land, electricity, talent, and subsidies, while also addressing local employment;
• Once production capacity is established, IP, processes, and talent will gradually seep into the U.S. semiconductor ecosystem like syrup.
Now, let’s examine the “15% export royalty.”
It resembles a “bloodsucker”:
• Regardless of how much Qualcomm, NVIDIA, or AMD sells, they must first pay Uncle Sam a fee;
• This fee is nominally a “technology royalty,” but in reality, it is a “global chip tax”;
• As long as Chinese customers still rely on high-end GPUs, CPUs, and RF chips, this 15% acts like a toll, with a perpetual queue.
In short: Washington wants to lock down others’ advanced production capacity while securing its profit pipeline, betting on both sides and reaping rewards from both.
03
Why do we only know how to “export tax rebates”?
The most painful comment in the discussion was, “You only know one trick: export tax rebates, refunding on everything, forever and ever.”
Indeed, for the past twenty years, we have treated export tax rebates as a panacea:
• Solar energy, home appliances, mobile phones, new energy vehicles… almost every industrial boom has been accompanied by an increase in tax rebate rates;
• The benefits are immediate: soaring export volumes, skyrocketing market shares, and global prices being undercut;
• The side effects are also glaring: profits are getting thinner, competition is becoming fiercer, and anti-dumping measures from abroad are increasing.
“Tax rebates” essentially use public finances to give companies red envelopes, helping them wage price wars overseas.
But when opponents no longer engage in price wars and instead directly impose “tariffs + royalties,” the red envelopes turn into “subsidies for foreigners.”
04
Breaking out of the “tax rebate competition,” we have three cards to play.
Card One: Turn “subsidies” into “equity”.
Instead of scattering hundreds of billions every year, it is better to establish a semiconductor industry fund and exchange equity for production capacity:
• You build a factory with me, I provide orders + land + low-interest loans, but I want equity;
• Future profits will be distributed proportionally;
• If you disobey one day, equity becomes a voting tool.
Card Two: Turn “markets” into “bargaining chips”.
The world’s largest single market is not just a slogan; it is a nuclear weapon:
• Advanced process equipment, EDA, photoresists, large silicon wafers… you can buy them, but first, sign a long-term supply agreement;
• Technology transfer, local joint ventures, and talent training must be included in the contract; breaching it means losing access;
• Make “selling technology” and “selling products” equally competitive, both requiring a queue.
Card Three: Turn “domestic substitution” into “ecological substitution”.
Stop treating “domestic products as backups” and instead promote backups to primary status:
• Government procurement, state-owned enterprise bidding, and operator procurement should specify clear ratios for domestic chips;
• Establish a “first set” insurance pool to reduce trial and error costs;
• Use system-level innovations (Chiplet, open-source RISC-V, heterogeneous computing) to bypass patent walls, rather than stubbornly pursuing 7nm and 5nm.
05
The other side of arrogance is always opportunity.
Washington’s “100% + 15%” seems clever, but it also boldly displays “America First”:
• When non-American chips are blocked from the U.S. market, they can only accelerate their move to China;
• When American chips incur an additional 15% “royalty,” Chinese customers gain greater bargaining power;
• When the U.S. divides “globalization” into “hemispherical” segments, whoever possesses the most complete industrial chain will have the opportunity to redefine the rules.
History does not simply repeat itself, but it often carries similar rhymes.
Ten years ago, we won the global solar energy market through export tax rebates; ten years later, if we can win advanced processes, the protagonist of the story should change.
After all, when opponents start to “double dip,” the best response has never been to complain, but to overturn the table and start a new game.