According to confidentiality laws and regulations, government agencies must classify national secret matters determined by higher authorities based on the level of confidentiality required; excerpts, quotes, and compilations of content that are classified as national secrets must be approved according to regulations, and the original document’s classification level, confidentiality period, and scope of knowledge must not be altered without authorization.
However, in practice, there are numerous violations where confidential documents are forwarded, quoted, or compiled without proper classification, and even instances where classification marks are removed, causing damage to national security and interests, while also casting a shadow over the violators’ futures.
Case 1: Forwarding confidential documents without proper classification.
In August 2011, a municipal health bureau received a classified document from higher authorities. The then-head of the health supervision department, Wang, drafted a notice to forward the document on a non-confidential computer, failing to classify it as required, and scanned two other classified documents to upload them to the municipal government website, resulting in a leak. Following the incident, Wang received an administrative warning, and other responsible individuals were dealt with accordingly.
Case 2: Quoting confidential documents without proper classification.
In April 2012, Sun, the head of the comprehensive section of a county civil air defense office, quoted content from a higher-level confidential document while drafting a plan for team formation, without proper classification. After the draft was prepared, the deputy director, Guo, failed to conduct a strict review, leading to the document being published on the county government website, resulting in a leak. Following the incident, Sun received an administrative demerit, and Guo received an administrative warning.
Case 3: Compiling confidential document materials without proper classification.
In July 2003, a provincial department decided to compile relevant work documents issued by the state and province into a selection for use within the department and system. Staff member Jin was specifically responsible for this task, collecting and organizing dozens of confidential documents and creating an electronic draft, but failed to classify it according to the highest confidentiality level of the confidential documents. The manuscript was later submitted to a publishing house, which also failed to conduct a strict review and, without informing the provincial department, allowed the book to be made into an electronic version by a digital publishing company, resulting in a leak. Following the incident, relevant departments imposed disciplinary actions on the responsible individuals.
Case 4: Unauthorized removal of confidentiality markings from documents.
In January 2014, Ding, a staff member of a county prevention office, forwarded two confidential documents issued by higher authorities without proper classification and unauthorizedly covered the classification marks before sending them to various townships. A staff member from one township organized the main content of the document and uploaded it to the internet, resulting in a leak. Following the incident, Ding received an administrative warning, and other responsible individuals were dealt with accordingly.
The occurrence of these cases fully exposes the issues of weak confidentiality awareness, lax responsibility, and loose management among some agencies and personnel handling confidential information, highlighting the profound lessons learned. Analyzing the reasons, several aspects can be identified.
First, strict enforcement of confidentiality discipline is lacking. Confidentiality discipline is an important aspect of political discipline. However, some agencies do not strictly enforce confidentiality discipline, and their staff are accustomed to processing confidential information on non-confidential computers and transmitting confidential documents over the internet. Particularly, staff from comprehensive and secretarial departments often search for information online and use non-confidential computers to draft speeches, plans, etc., containing confidential or sensitive information; they transmit confidential document information via internet email, QQ, WeChat, and other social media; and they casually scan and copy national secrets without including the scanned or copied documents in the management of confidential documents, leading to a situation where confidentiality “iron rules” become “freedom rules.”
Second, the responsibility system for confidentiality work is virtually non-existent. The confidentiality work responsibility system mainly includes the responsibility of leading cadres for confidentiality work, classification responsibility, and the responsibility of personnel managing and maintaining confidential information systems. Implementing a confidentiality work responsibility system is intended to strengthen the organization and leadership of confidentiality work, clarify the responsibilities of relevant personnel, and ensure that confidentiality work is effectively implemented. In the investigation of the aforementioned cases, these agencies either did not establish relevant confidentiality systems, leaving staff unaware of what constitutes a national secret, how to maintain confidentiality, what procedures to follow, or they had systems that were merely posted on walls or written on paper, lacking relevance to the actual situation of the agency, and lacking operability and specificity, leading staff to forget classification requirements in specific processes, resulting in violations.
Third, confidentiality review processes are lax. The occurrence of the aforementioned cases is partly due to a lack of control at the source, with individuals unaware of the need for classification, how to classify, or unable to classify according to regulations, making it impossible for the next link in document circulation to correctly follow confidentiality procedures; on the other hand, the review of information disclosure and confidentiality is not strict, failing to adhere to the principles of “whoever discloses, whoever reviews,” pre-review, and legal review. Some agencies have lax confidentiality reviews for government information releases, leading to a mere formality without implementing the “three reviews and three checks” system, which requires self-review by the information providing department, specialized review by the information disclosure work agency, and approval by the responsible leader, resulting in the inability to timely discover and effectively prevent confidential information from being published online, ultimately leading to self-inflicted consequences.
Learning from past mistakes, to curb the improper classification of documents at the source, several measures should be taken.
First, education on the “two recognitions” should be continuous. Strengthen education and training for personnel handling confidential information, guiding them to learn confidentiality knowledge, master classification procedures, and develop confidentiality habits. Emphasize daily education and guidance for party members, cadres, and the public to learn about confidentiality, understand confidentiality, and know confidentiality, effectively integrating confidentiality awareness and knowledge into every aspect and detail, continuously improving confidentiality awareness and knowledge under information technology conditions, building a strong ideological defense line, and enhancing preventive capabilities.
Second, system implementation must be strict. Based on confidentiality laws and regulations, combined with the specific circumstances of the agency, effective management measures should be developed, including management systems for classification and declassification work, and confidentiality review systems for online information, ensuring that confidentiality management work has clear guidelines. Regularly inspect prominent issues and risks in the implementation of confidentiality systems, identify weak links, address shortcomings, and ensure implementation. For incomplete systems, relevant departments should be urged to improve them promptly; for strict enforcement of systems, responsible individuals should be criticized, and those causing leaks of national secrets should face disciplinary actions.
Third, responsibility must be taken seriously. Agencies are the main bodies for classification and should be responsible for exercising classification rights and fulfilling classification management duties. The heads of agencies, as the legally responsible individuals for classification, bear overall responsibility for classification work. Those responsible for confidentiality work in the office must strictly fulfill their legal duties to ensure work implementation. Leaders at all levels should lead by example in adhering to confidentiality regulations, setting a good example, and actively promoting compliance among all agency personnel, collectively shouldering the significant responsibility of ensuring the implementation of the party’s confidentiality policies.
Fourth, self-inspection and correction must be targeted. The confidentiality committee and confidentiality work institutions of agencies should undertake supervision responsibilities for classification, inspecting the implementation of classification systems and the legal fulfillment of responsibilities by classification personnel. If improper classification issues are found, they should be promptly corrected. Strengthen self-supervision and inspection of the implementation of information disclosure and confidentiality review systems, timely discover and close leaks, and prevent leaks from occurring.
Originally published in the October 2017 issue of “Confidentiality Work,” author: Liu Jingsong, original title: “Addressing the Vulnerabilities in Classifying Confidential Documents During Forwarding, Quoting, and Compiling.”
This issue edited by: Gao Jian
