The military interaction between agriculture and nomadic regimes is an important issue in studying the ancient relations between the Hu and Han. In the context of the integration of Hu and Han during the late Sui and early Tang, both the Central Plains dynasty and the steppe powers showed a tendency to learn from each other’s military strengths. However, the vast differences in their modes of production made it impossible for them to fully converge. The key to the Tang dynasty’s strong military power was not the complete replacement of the regular army with foreign troops, but rather the realization of the complementarity and coordination between the agricultural and pastoral military forces. Emperor Taizong established a political pattern that spanned both the north and south, with a large number of Turkic and Uighur cavalry entering the Tang military system, cooperating with the regular army and recruited soldiers, greatly enhancing the military strength of the Tang dynasty in terms of technology, tactics, and campaigns, forming a military strategy that combined agriculture and pastoralism.
During the reign of Emperor Gaozong, the pattern of “south and north crossing” came to an end, but even until the An Lushan Rebellion, the Tang dynasty was still able to utilize the affiliated steppe tribes on the border to continue the military strategy of combining agriculture and pastoralism. By viewing from the perspective of military strategy, we can further understand the historical process of interaction between ancient agricultural and pastoral civilizations.
Keywords: Tang Dynasty, Military Strategy, Agricultural-Pastoral Interaction, “South and North Crossing”, Infantry-Cavalry Coordination
Author Liu Zifan, Associate Researcher at the Institute of Ancient History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Dunhuang Studies Research Center. Address: No. 1 Courtyard, North Road, National Stadium, Chaoyang District, Beijing, Postal Code 100101.
The different military cultures of agriculture and nomadic regimes and their mutual integration are important issues in studying the ancient relations between the Hu and Han. Cavalry is regarded as the traditional military advantage relied upon by steppe powers, while agricultural regimes mainly counter it by organizing large-scale infantry. However, there are no absolute boundaries between the two; at least since the Warring States period, the Central Plains regimes have attempted to introduce the strategy of “Hu clothing and cavalry shooting”. After experiencing extensive Hu-Han exchanges during the Wei, Jin, Southern and Northern Dynasties, the Central Plains army naturally integrated many cavalry combat methods. The Tang dynasty saw the emergence of a large number of foreign soldiers and generals, becoming a significant feature of its military organization. Chen Yinke pointed out that the importance of foreign generals lies in “the organization of tribes and the technology of cavalry shooting”. Emperor Taizong, due to the inability of the regular army to withstand attacks, made foreign generals the main component of his military power. Ma Chi further noted that after Taizong and even in the late Tang, foreign generals and the foreign troops they commanded were still the “main component of imperial military power”. Wang Yuanchao also clearly stated that the military tactics of the Tang dynasty were influenced by the Hu military tactics, reflecting the integration and cultural exchange between the Hu and Han. However, a close examination of historical details reveals that the Tang dynasty did not completely replace the regular army with foreign troops as the main fighting force. The differences in agricultural and pastoral modes of production determined that while there was integration between the military cultures of the Central Plains and the steppe, they could not completely replace each other, still maintaining their respective combat methods centered on infantry or cavalry. The enhancement of the military strength of the Tang dynasty mainly relied on directly mobilizing steppe cavalry for combat through the “south and north crossing,” allowing Han soldiers and foreign cavalry to support each other, thus achieving the integration of the two military traditions. This article intends to examine the formation and characteristics of the military strategy combining agriculture and pastoralism in the Tang dynasty, to gain insight into the interaction model of agricultural and pastoral civilizations.
1. The Mutual Influence and Limitations of Agricultural and Pastoral Military Traditions
At the end of the Sui and the beginning of the Tang, the military technological exchanges and interactions between the Central Plains dynasty and the steppe powers presented new forms. The most notable is that during the time Li Yuan served as the governor of Taiyuan, he imitated Turkic tactics to train cavalry shooting. The “Chronicles of the Great Tang’s Founding” records:
(Li Yuan) said: “The Turkic strength relies solely on cavalry and shooting; they advance when they see benefits and retreat when they know it is difficult, swift as the wind and lightning, with no fixed formation. They use bows and arrows as their claws and armor as their everyday wear. Their formations are not lined up, and their camps have no fixed locations, living wherever the water and grass are, using sheep and horses as military supplies. They seek wealth when victorious, and when defeated, they feel no shame, with no labor for night patrols or costs for fortifications and supplies. In contrast, Chinese troops often fall behind in battles against them, rarely achieving success. If we imitate their methods and habits, they will know there is no profit to be made, and they will naturally not come.”… Thus, he selected over two thousand capable of cavalry shooting, providing them with food and shelter, and they lived together with the Turkic people, following the water and grass, far from the borders.
The Turkic people were the dominant force in the northern steppes at that time. Especially after the ascension of Shibi Khan, they besieged Emperor Yang of Sui at Yanmen and militarily suppressed the Sui dynasty for a time. Although the Central Plains dynasty had widely used cavalry since the Sixteen Kingdoms, making it an important military branch, the developmental direction of cavalry in the Central Plains and the steppe differed. The main force of the cavalry in the Northern Dynasties was heavily armored cavalry, where knights wore helmets and armor, and their warhorses were also armored, protecting the horse’s neck and body. Such heavily armored cavalry was typically used for “charging into the formation,” which means to charge the enemy infantry formation. In contrast, Turkic cavalry were mostly light cavalry, and their warhorses were not armored, making their tactics more flexible and mobile. Li Yuan’s description of “advancing when they see benefits, retreating when they know it is difficult, swift as the wind and lightning” vividly depicts the mobility of Turkic cavalry. To train cavalry in imitation of Turkic tactics, Li Yuan needed to change the Central Plains tradition of relying on heavily armored cavalry and adopt new military tactics. After Li Yuan initiated his rebellion in Taiyuan, he directly borrowed Turkic cavalry as an important force. With the development of warfare practices and the advancement of lethal weapons, as well as the influence of Turkic cavalry, the main force of Tang cavalry also began to evolve towards light cavalry, marking another transformation in the tactics and equipment of ancient Central Plains cavalry.
However, from the overall situation of the Tang army at the beginning of the dynasty, the combat troops from the Central Plains were still mainly infantry, and the proportion of cavalry was relatively limited compared to the steppe powers. The “Comprehensive Treatise” Volume 148 cites the “Military Tactics of Li Jing, the Duke of Tang”:
When the generals set out to battle, they were to appoint two thousand troops and divide them into seven armies… The central army had four thousand men, including two thousand eight hundred combat troops, totaling fifty-six teams. Among the combat troops, there were four hundred crossbowmen, four hundred archers, one thousand cavalry, five hundred light cavalry, and five hundred special troops. Each side had one army, with each army having two thousand eight hundred men, of which each took one thousand nine hundred combat troops, totaling seventy-six teams. Among the combat troops, each army had three hundred crossbowmen, three hundred archers, five hundred cavalry, four hundred light cavalry, and four hundred special troops. Each side had two armies, each army had two thousand six hundred men, and each took one thousand eight hundred fifty combat troops. Among the combat troops, each army had two hundred fifty crossbowmen, three hundred archers, five hundred cavalry, four hundred light cavalry, and four hundred special troops. The total number of infantry and cavalry was fourteen thousand, with two hundred eighty teams ready for battle, while six thousand were guarding the supplies.
This is an important record regarding the composition of the army in the early Tang dynasty. The mobilized army can be roughly divided into combat troops and supply troops, with combat troops further including crossbowmen, archers, cavalry, light cavalry, and special troops. According to Li Jing’s ideal model, when the mobilized army consisted of twenty thousand men, the combat troops available for battle were fourteen thousand, among which the cavalry totaled four thousand, accounting for 20% of the total military strength; even by the proportion of combat troops, the cavalry only accounted for 28.6%. Overall, infantry still made up the vast majority. In actual warfare, the proportion of cavalry might have been even lower. In the fifteenth year of the Zhenguan era (641), Emperor Taizong ordered multiple routes to attack Xue Yantuo, among which Li Shiji, the commander of the army in Shuozhou, led sixty thousand troops, with one thousand two hundred cavalry, while Li Daliang, the commander of the army in Lingzhou, led forty thousand troops, with five thousand cavalry, both failing to reach the proportions recorded in the “Military Tactics of Li Jing,” while Zhang Shigui, the commander of the army in Qingzhou, led seventeen thousand troops, possibly without any significant cavalry. It can be seen that the proportion of cavalry in the Central Plains army during the Tang dynasty was not high.
In an era when the military power of the Tang dynasty was strong, the proportion of cavalry in the Central Plains combat troops still could not match that of infantry. The most important reason is that the agricultural mode of production could not provide a sufficient quantity and quality of horses and knights. The steppe environment was undoubtedly more suitable for the growth and breeding of horses. Denis Sinor pointed out that “the horses of Inner Asia, especially in their adaptability to climate and endurance, surpass all other warhorses,” while “horses are the only commodity in the Inner Asian steppe economy that can achieve large-scale surplus production.” Chang Yu referred to this as the “comparative low-cost advantage” of horse usage in steppe armies, meaning that compared to agricultural areas, the large-scale breeding of horses in nomadic areas is a low-cost economic activity, and the cost of training individual military skills is greatly reduced. The personal riding and shooting abilities of nomads are closely tied to their lifestyle and economic production methods from a young age.
As recorded in Zhang Shuo’s “Stele of Praise for the Shepherd of Longyou in the Thirteenth Year of Kaiyuan”:
After the Tang dynasty took over the chaos left by the Zhou and Sui, gathering the remnants, they only managed to obtain three thousand mares and stallions… Starting from the Zhenguan era, it grew to seventy thousand six hundred horses in forty years… Some were attacked by foreign tribes, and some were troubled by internal bandits. After the reign of Zhuangguang, more than twenty years later, half of these were consumed, and what remained was very few.
Furthermore, the “New Book of Tang: Military Records” states:
At the beginning of Kaiyuan, the national horses were further depleted… Nine years later, it was decreed: “… The common people are suffering, so many do not raise horses, hence the number of cavalry has decreased compared to before. From now on, the people in various states should not limit the number of horses they can raise. Those who can raise more than ten horses will be exempt from postal service and military requisition.”… After this, the Turkic people were pacified, and Emperor Xuanzong treated them generously, allowing for the exchange of horses with gold and silk at the border of the Shuofang army. After mixing with Hu breeds, the horses became stronger.
At the beginning of the Tang dynasty, there were not many horses, and it took forty years of breeding to reach a scale of seventy thousand horses, but soon after the reign of Wu Zetian, half were consumed again. In the early years of Kaiyuan, it was even necessary to encourage the common people to raise horses to make up for the lack of national horses. It wasn’t until the end of Kaiyuan that large quantities of Turkic horses were introduced through trade, significantly improving the situation of horse shortages. Overall, even during the strong national power of the early Tang dynasty, it was impossible to maintain a large-scale herd of horses continuously. The decree mentioned in the Xuanzong era about “the common people suffering, hence many do not raise horses, causing the number of cavalry to decrease compared to before” also highlights the relative disadvantage of the Tang dynasty in training cavalry, as it could not combine the cultivation of knights with the production practices of the common people, requiring more resources compared to the steppes to train cavalry.
If the Tang army relied solely on the regular army and recruited soldiers for warfare, the low proportion of cavalry would undoubtedly place them at an absolute disadvantage in mobility against the steppe armies, which relied primarily on cavalry. Infantry could utilize terrain or vehicle equipment to form tight military formations, excelling in defense but unable to deliver fatal blows to the nomadic cavalry. This is what Li Yuan previously stated: “Chinese troops often fall behind in battles against them, rarely achieving success.” The Sui dynasty faced this issue when combating the Turkic people, as recorded in the “Book of Sui: Biography of Yang Su”: “The generals fought against the nomads, always fearing the cavalry’s charge, using war chariots to mix infantry and cavalry, forming square formations with deer antlers, with cavalry hidden inside. Su said to the people: ‘This is a way to secure oneself, not a way to win.'” Yang Su ultimately defeated the Turkic leader by utilizing cavalry formations, but from the records above, it is clear that the conventional tactics of the Sui army were traditional infantry formations, with cavalry hidden within. Its advantages and disadvantages are also very apparent: while it can secure itself, it cannot achieve victory.
From another perspective, the steppe armies, which heavily relied on cavalry, also found it difficult to achieve quick victories when facing well-trained and highly motivated infantry formations. As mentioned earlier, infantry can rely on war chariots and deer antlers for protection against cavalry charges. At the same time, the bows and crossbows of infantry also pose significant lethality to cavalry. Every combat soldier in the Tang dynasty was equipped with a bow, and according to the previous “Military Tactics of Li Jing,” specialized archers accounted for as much as 30% of the total number of combat soldiers. The Tang dynasty also developed specialized tactics for crossbow shooting, as recorded in the “Comprehensive Treatise”: “When forming separate teams, arrows should be concentrated for shooting, so that there are no standing soldiers in front and no horizontal formations. Furthermore, arrows should be shot from the formation, and the sequence should be rotated, ensuring that the sound of crossbows does not cease and the enemy cannot easily breach our defenses.” In the Song dynasty, infantry became even more reliant on combat, and crossbows further became the main weapon to restrain the northern steppe cavalry, with crossbowmen becoming the backbone of the army. Even when facing cavalry charging to the front, infantry formations could still adopt tactics to attack the enemy cavalry and horses. Thus, even if the steppe powers surrounded infantry formations with superior numbers, they often found it difficult to achieve easy victories. During the Han dynasty, Li Ling was surrounded by heavy cavalry of the Xiongnu and fought while retreating, causing heavy casualties to the Xiongnu cavalry before surrendering due to running out of arrows. In the Sui dynasty, Zhao Zhongqing, isolated in enemy territory, “was surrounded by all the Turkic forces, and Zhongqing formed a square formation, resisting for five days before breaking the enemy with reinforcements.” The Tang dynasty often saw strategies of infantry and cavalry working together to defeat the enemy, mostly with infantry formations at the front to repel the enemy, indicating that the regular army was far from being “unable to withstand attacks.”
The military of the nomadic regimes was also not purely composed of cavalry as a single unit. The inscriptions in Turkic languages record some instances of their infantry combat, as mentioned in the “Stele of Kül Tigin” on the east side, line 32, which states that in 731, the Turkic army clashed with the Tang army: “Kül Tigin led infantry charges.” In the “Tuyug Valley Stele,” line 4 on the west side records that in the second half of the 7th century, during the restoration of the Turkic state, “two parts of the army were mounted, and one part was foot soldiers.” Cai Hongsheng believes that cavalry accounted for two-thirds of the Turkic army. However, a close examination of the records in the “Tuyug Valley Stele” indicates that this specifically refers to the initial 700 Turkic people, who may have lacked horses. Under normal circumstances, the proportion of cavalry in the Turkic army should still exceed two-thirds. Denis Sinor also pointed out that the military strength of nomadic regimes is undoubtedly based on cavalry, and the occasional use of infantry is mostly due to supply issues regarding horses.
A clear example of the steppe army actively employing infantry tactics is the foot battle of Xue Yantuo during the early Tang dynasty. The “Comprehensive Treatise” Volume 161 records:
During the Zhenguan era of the Great Tang, the northern Di tribe, Tiele, Xue Yantuo, along with Tongluo, Pugu, and Uighurs, united to form an army of two hundred thousand and crossed the desert… Previously, Yantuo defeated the Turkic Shabo and She’er using infantry tactics and won. When they planned to invade, they first held military drills in their homeland, training infantry, with one person in every group of five trained in battle formations while the other four fought in front. If they won, they would be given horses to pursue the fleeing enemy. If they failed to respond, the punishment was death, and their families would be punished.
Xue Yantuo was one of the stronger tribes of the Tiele, located southwest of the Jinshan (now Altai Mountains) during the late Sui and early Tang. In the second year of Zhenguan, when the Eastern Turkic state was in turmoil, the leader Yiman led his tribe across the Jinshan to the northern steppes, defeating the Eastern Turkic forces along with Uighur and other Tiele tribes. The “Historical Records” states: “Xue Yantuo defeated their four leaders, and Ke Li could not control them.” Ke Li was the Great Khan of the Eastern Turkic, and the so-called “four leaders” should refer to the Turkic Shabo and She’er mentioned earlier, who were the elite leaders sent by the Eastern Turkic to conquer Tiele. After this, Yiman was supported by the Tiele tribes and Xue Yantuo became the most powerful force in the northern steppes. It is noteworthy that Xue Yantuo, as a typical nomadic tribe, achieved significant victories in the great battles against the Turkic leaders such as Ashina She’er by employing infantry-centric tactics, establishing their position in the northern steppes. In the fifteenth year of Zhenguan, Xue Yantuo planned a large-scale southward advance, intending to pressure the Turkic tribes that were affiliated with the Tang dynasty, and similarly planned to employ infantry tactics, conducting extensive infantry training.
The infantry tactics of Xue Yantuo essentially involved dismounting cavalry for foot combat, where five men formed a group, with one dismounting to hold the horse while the other four fought in front; after winning the foot battle, they would mount to pursue. If the horse holder failed to respond, they would be punished. The “Military Tactics of Li Jing” quoted in the Tang dynasty also contains similar records:
Once the formations are established, upon hearing the drum signal, the battle teams will enter, while the two battle teams will also enter from the back… In all battles with the enemy, the light cavalry, special troops, and cavalry teams must allocate personnel to dismount. The team must allocate horse holders and establish names. If during battle, the horse holder fails to respond or becomes confused, causing the loss of horse saddles, they will be executed. If the enemy retreats, the infantry should not pursue more than thirty steps, nor should they mount immediately to chase. If they know the enemy is retreating and is in disarray, then they can ride to pursue northward while advancing alongside all teams.
This is a typical tactic of infantry-cavalry cooperation, where the infantry battle teams engage in combat in the front, while the cavalry and special troops are positioned behind to wait for an opportunity to engage the enemy. To strengthen the infantry formation, the cavalry, special troops, and light cavalry also need to allocate personnel to join the military formation. Cavalry were also required to have designated horse holders who needed to respond in a timely manner, and after the enemy’s defeat, they would mount according to the situation. It is clear that the methods of dismounted cavalry combat recorded in the “Military Tactics of Li Jing” are very similar to those of Xue Yantuo, except that Xue Yantuo relied entirely on the foot combat of the cavalry without specialized infantry support. Although there is currently no evidence to suggest that Xue Yantuo directly borrowed the foot combat methods commonly used by the Central Plains dynasty, at least there are points of connection between the two.
The fact that Xue Yantuo adopted the foot combat methods commonly used by agricultural regimes may be related to their unique environment in the southwest of Jinshan. The Tiele tribes were widely distributed, and local tribal customs varied slightly. The “Book of Sui: Biography of the Tiele” records: “Those near the western border are mostly engaged in agriculture, having many cattle and sheep but few horses.” This indicates that some Tiele tribes scattered in the western regions had begun to engage in agriculture. From the documents unearthed in Turpan, it can be seen that Xue Yantuo maintained close interactions with Gaochang. In the thirty-first year of the Yan Chang kingdom (591), records mention “Zhan Tou Tuan Shi” and “Zhan Tou Da Guan Shi” arriving in Gaochang. “Zhan Tou” refers to Xue Yantuo. In the first year of the Great Sui (605), the western Tiele tribes rebelled against the Eastern Turkic, and the leader of the Qibi declared himself the Great Khan, while the leader of Xue Yantuo became the small khan, historically known as “Yiwuh, Gaochang, and Yanzhi all submitted to this.” Therefore, even while residing in the southwest of Jinshan, Xue Yantuo had deep exchanges with the oasis states in the western regions that exhibited agricultural cultural characteristics. It is also possible that there were some displaced Han people residing among the Tiele tribes during the late Sui and early Tang. In the twenty-first year of Zhenguan, Emperor Taizong issued a decree: “During the chaos at the end of the Sui, many border residents were captured by the Hu and Di. Now that the Tiele have submitted, it is advisable to send envoys to the states of Yanran and others to communicate with the governors and search for the displaced people.” Since Xue Yantuo migrated to the northern steppes in the second year of Zhenguan and was destroyed in the twentieth year, there were continuous exchanges between Xue Yantuo and the Tang dynasty.
There are records of the decisive battle between Xue Yantuo and the Tang army in the fifteenth year of Zhenguan, from which we can see the practical effects and limitations of Xue Yantuo’s infantry tactics. The “Comprehensive Treatise” provides a detailed account:
Thus, Xue Yantuo set up thirty thousand cavalry to besiege the Great Wall… Li Shiji selected six thousand elite cavalry from his ranks to intercept them on the main road… Yantuo’s forces were large and camped for days until they reached the Nuo Zhen River, where they camped for ten miles. The Turkic forces initially battled them but were defeated, fleeing back. Yantuo pursued them, and the Tang soldiers suffered many casualties. Li Shiji ordered all soldiers to dismount, wielding long spears, and charged forward. The Yantuo army collapsed, and the deputy commander, Xue Wanche, captured several thousand horse holders. Xue Yantuo lost their horses and did not know what to do, while the Tang soldiers pursued and killed over three thousand and captured over fifty thousand.
In this battle, the Tang army and Turkic forces each had six thousand cavalry, making a long-distance march to confront the thirty thousand strong army of Xue Yantuo. The Turkic and Tang cavalry charged in succession but were repelled by the foot formations of Xue Yantuo. It is noteworthy that the statement “ten thousand arrows were shot, and many Tang horses died” indicates that the foot formations of Xue Yantuo had a significant advantage over the light cavalry due to their ability to kill horses from a distance. Although foot shooting does not have the mobility of cavalry shooting, it excels in shooting distance. For example, in the Song dynasty, the standard for foot shooting was much higher than for horse shooting, with foot shooting being far more powerful. According to the records in the “Black Tatars’ Brief History,” dismounted foot shooting was also a common tactic of Mongolian cavalry, which utilized foot shooting to accurately inflict damage on the enemy. This helps to understand that Xue Yantuo’s foot shooting against the unarmored Turkic light cavalry could inflict damage from a distance, waiting for a chance to defeat them.
However, the Tang cavalry also dismounted to form a formation and charged the Xue Yantuo army, ultimately defeating the numerically superior Yantuo forces, showcasing the shortcomings of Xue Yantuo’s infantry tactics. The most important aspect of infantry combat is maintaining a stable formation, which requires long-term training and strict discipline. The nomadic way of life is evidently not conducive to training excellent infantry formations. Xue Yantuo’s reliance solely on foot combat against the well-trained infantry of the Central Plains would naturally put them at a disadvantage, especially since the Tang army employed tactics of infantry and cavalry working together, leading to the encirclement of Xue Yantuo’s forces and their eventual defeat. It can be seen that while Xue Yantuo’s adoption of infantry tactics similar to those of the Central Plains had advantages against steppe tribes that primarily relied on cavalry, it was clearly at a disadvantage when facing the infantry-centered Tang army.
In summary, during the transition from the Sui to the Tang, there was extensive military technological exchange and mutual learning between the Central Plains and the steppe. However, the distinct primary modes of production of agriculture and pastoralism determined that they could not fully adopt each other’s methods of warfare. The Tang dynasty’s army from the Central Plains still had to rely primarily on infantry, while nomadic regimes continued to depend on cavalry. The two military traditions coexisted without conflict, which also highlights the limitations of agricultural-pastoral exchanges during this period.
2. The Military Strategy of Agriculture and Pastoralism Under the “South and North Crossing” Pattern
During the reigns of Taizong and Gaozong, the Tang dynasty established the basic situation on the border through consecutive military campaigns, which has always been regarded as a manifestation of strong military power. However, during this period, the Tang dynasty did not completely replace the regular army with foreign troops, but rather achieved the complementarity of the two military forces under the political pattern of spanning both sides of the Great Wall, integrating agricultural and pastoral areas, and overcoming the limitations mentioned above regarding the inability of agricultural and pastoral regimes to fully adopt each other’s methods of warfare.
As early as the Eastern Han to the Three Kingdoms period, Hu cavalry had already been integrated into the Central Plains military system, but the nomadic regime in the northern steppes was usually in a state of opposition to the Central Plains dynasty. With the establishment of a nominal sovereign-subject relationship between the Sui dynasty and the Turkic people, military cooperation began to emerge between the Central Plains dynasty and the steppe tribes, although during this period, the Sui army mainly supported Shabo Khan and Qimin Khan in stabilizing internal situations, without achieving large-scale infantry-cavalry cooperation. The Tang dynasty took a further step by incorporating most of the northern steppe into its jurisdiction. First, in the fourth year of Zhenguan, the Tang army captured Ke Li Khan, leading to the collapse of the Eastern Turkic Khanate and a large number of Turkic tribes moving south. The Tang dynasty settled them in areas from Youzhou to the Hetao region, establishing prefectures and counties to govern them. Following this, in the twentieth year of Zhenguan, the northern Tiele tribes submitted, and the Tang dynasty widely established prefectures and counties among them. In the second year of Gaozong’s reign (657), the Tang dynasty defeated the Western Turkic, establishing prefectures and counties in their various tribes. Thus, during the reigns of Taizong and Gaozong, the Tang dynasty achieved a new type of agricultural-pastoral relationship by governing most of the northern steppe tribes through the prefectures and counties. Li Hongbin referred to this as the “south and north crossing,” meaning spanning both sides of the Great Wall. This concept is used to depict the political pattern of the Tang dynasty that integrated the agricultural regions of the Central Plains with the pastoral regions of the northern steppes. On this basis, an even larger number of steppe nomadic cavalry gradually entered the Tang military system.
The time frame for the Tang dynasty achieving the “south and north crossing” can be roughly considered from the fourth year of Zhenguan, when the Turkic surrender was settled, until the first year of Gaozong’s reign (679), when the Turkic people revolted against the Tang. During this period, in several large-scale wars, there were often steppe cavalry cooperating with the Central Plains army to complete the campaigns, as detailed in the table below.
Year of Expedition | Target of Campaign | Chief Commander | Participating Foreign Troops
—|—|—|—
Zhenguan Year 8 (634) | Tuyuhun | Duan Zhixuan and others | Qibi, Dangxiang
Zhenguan Year 8-9 (634-635) | Tuyuhun | Li Jing and others | Turkic, Qibi
Zhenguan Year 14 (640) | Gaochang | Hou Junchi and others | Eastern Turkic, Qibi
Zhenguan Year 15 (641) | Xue Yantuo | Li Shiji and others | Eastern Turkic
Zhenguan Year 19 (645) | Goguryeo | Taizong personally led the campaign | Lan, Hezhou submitted to Hu; Turkic
Zhenguan Year 20 (646) | Xue Yantuo | Li Daozong and others | Eastern Turkic, Qibi
Zhenguan Year 21-22 (647-648) | Kucha | Ashina She’er, Guo Xiaoke and others | Tiele, Eastern Turkic, Tubo, Tuyuhun
Zhenguan Year 23 to Yonghui Year 1 (649-650) | Eastern Turkic | Chebi Khan | Hu, Han troops 500,000
Zhenguan Year 2 (651) | Western Turkic | Ashina Helu and others | Hu, Han
Zhenguan Year 4 (653) | Western Turkic | Ashina Helu and others | Hu
Xianqing Year 2 (657) | Western Turkic | Ashina Helu and others | Hu, Western Turkic
Xianqing Year 5 (660) | Khitan | Ashide Shubing and others | Eastern Turkic
Longshuo Year 1 (661) | Goguryeo | Ashina Helu and others | Hu, Western Turkic
Longshuo Year 2 (662) | Kucha | Su Haizheng and others | Western Turkic
Qianfeng Year 1 to Zongzhang Year 1 (666-668) | Goguryeo | Li Jue, Qibi Helu and others | Hu, Han
Longshuo Year 1 (661) | Goguryeo | Su Dingfang and others | Hu, Western Turkic
Longshuo Year 2 (662) | Kucha | Su Haizheng and others | Western Turkic
Qianfeng Year 1 to Zongzhang Year 1 (666-668) | Goguryeo | Li Jue, Qibi Helu and others | Hu, Han
Longshuo Year 1 (661) | Goguryeo | Su Dingfang and others | Hu, Western Turkic
As shown in the table, the northern steppe cavalry participated in the Tang dynasty’s campaigns against Tuyuhun, Gaochang, Kucha, Xue Yantuo, Western Turkic, and Goguryeo, laying the foundation for the basic situation on the Tang frontier during the early period. The participation of steppe cavalry in these campaigns can be divided into several different stages. During the Zhenguan period, the main participants were the earlier surrendered Turkic and Qibi tribes. After the twentieth year of Zhenguan, the main forces mobilized were the Uighur and other northern Tiele tribes, while after the second year of Xianqing, Western Turkic cavalry frequently cooperated with the Tang dynasty in military actions in the western regions. This coincided with the gradual expansion of the Tang dynasty’s governing range, as the number of affiliated steppe tribes increased, the Tang army also gained more support from steppe cavalry. The number of steppe cavalry participating in battles was significant; records indicate that in the twenty-third year of Zhenguan, when attacking Kucha, the command was given to “Thirteen States of Tiele” and the Turkic forces to jointly attack, indicating the scale of mobilization. Unfortunately, there are not many specific records on troop ratios in Tang materials, but one clearer record is found in the “New Book of Tang: Turkic Records”, which states that in the third year of Yonghui, when attacking Ashina Helu, “Thirty thousand regular troops were mobilized, combined with fifty thousand Uighur cavalry to attack them.” This battle mobilized a large number of Uighur cavalry, even exceeding the Central Plains troops. Of course, the troop ratios would vary according to specific situations in each campaign, but at least it indicates that steppe cavalry held an important position in the military of the early Tang dynasty.
Thus, the Tang dynasty formed a military strategy characterized by the combination of agriculture and pastoralism. Modern military theory typically categorizes strategy into different levels, with E. Luttwak proposing that strategy comprises five levels from grassroots to high-level: technology, tactics, campaigns, regional strategy, and grand strategy. Zeng Ruilong has attempted to use a multi-level strategic framework to analyze the Song-Liao wars, thereby depicting the military strategy of the Song dynasty in a more dimensional manner. Similarly, for the Tang dynasty’s military issues, strategy analysis methods can also be employed to outline the military characteristics of agriculture and pastoralism.
1. On the technical level, the inclusion of steppe military forces provided the Tang dynasty with a sufficient number of warhorses for expeditions. The Tang dynasty had advantages in mineral resources and technology, coupled with strong economic power, which made its armor, bows, crossbows, swords, and other equipment undoubtedly more complete compared to surrounding regimes. However, as mentioned earlier, due to the limitations of agricultural production modes, the Tang dynasty relatively lacked an important resource for warfare in the cold weapon era—warhorses. When a large number of northern steppe cavalry were available for the Tang dynasty’s use, the overall combat power in terms of cavalry and warhorses would greatly increase.
2. On the tactical level, the cooperation between Han and foreign infantry and cavalry strengthened the infantry’s formation in repelling enemies and the cavalry’s decisive strikes to achieve victory, giving the Tang army a significant advantage in open-field battles. Since the late Eastern Han, the Central Plains army had already conventionally adopted infantry-cavalry cooperative tactics, where elite cavalry would charge and penetrate the enemy formation or outflank to attack from the rear, cooperating with infantry to break the formation. In fact, after Li Yuan initiated his rebellion in Taiyuan, he borrowed Turkic cavalry. The “Chronicles of the Great Tang’s Founding” records that in the thirteenth year of the Daxing era, “Five hundred Turkic cavalry and two thousand horses” came to assist in the battle. Also, the “Tomb Inscription of Zhi Shanshan” states: “My great-grandfather Yan, originally from the Turkic Ke Li. When the emperor first rose in Taiyuan, he sent several thousand cavalry to assist in the capital.” Therefore, the Tang dynasty employed infantry-cavalry cooperative tactics in its founding battles, such as in the first year of Wude when fighting against Xue Rengao, where Li Shimin first ordered the army to form a formation in the shallow waters, and after the front troops engaged, he led the main army to charge from the north of the plain, “Taizong led several dozen elite cavalry into the enemy formation, causing the enemy to collapse.” In the fourth year of Wude, during the battle of Sishui against Dou Jiande, when the troops engaged, “Taizong led Shi Dainai, Cheng Yaojin, Qin Shubao, and Yuwen Xin to charge into the enemy’s rear, displaying our banners. The enemy, seeing this, collapsed.” However, the Turkic cavalry were only temporary allies, and the Tang dynasty needed to pay political or economic costs, making it impossible to rely on them as a standing military force.
With the realization of the “south and north crossing” pattern, as the Turkic and other steppe cavalry began to accept mobilization from the Tang court and cooperate with the Central Plains troops in battle, the infantry-cavalry cooperative tactics of the Tang army played a greater role. Especially when facing the relatively homogeneous steppe forces, the Tang army could effectively utilize infantry formations for defense while having enough cavalry to achieve decisive victories through flanking or pursuit. For instance, in the fifteenth year of Zhenguan when attacking Xue Yantuo, Li Shiji “selected six thousand elite cavalry from his ranks to intercept them on the main road,” while the Tang army dismounted to form a foot battle formation, with cavalry encircling the enemy’s reserve horses, thus achieving victory. Similarly, in the second year of Xianqing, during the decisive battle against the Western Turkic Khan Ashina Helu, Su Dingfang “led over ten thousand Uighur and Han troops” to encounter the main force of the Western Turkic, which had one hundred thousand cavalry. The “New Book of Tang: Turkic Records” states:
When the enemy saw the small number of troops, they surrounded the Tang army with cavalry. Dingfang ordered the infantry to take a high position to form a formation, gathering spears outside, and he arranged his cavalry in the north. Helu first attacked the troops on the high ground three times, but the army did not budge. Dingfang then unleashed his cavalry, causing the enemy to collapse.
This is a typical example of infantry-cavalry cooperative combat, where the infantry troops formed a defensive formation against the enemy, while the cavalry remained behind to wait for an opportunity. In fact, spears are typically used in cavalry combat, and the Tang army’s formation of spears indicates that they were likely originally cavalry, tasked with launching a surprise attack. When encountering the enemy army, they dismounted to form a formation. Even so, the Tang army’s infantry formations could still rely on their inherent organization and discipline to withstand the three charges from the Western Turkic cavalry, showcasing the defensive advantages of infantry formations. After increasing the Uighur cavalry, the Tang army’s mobility significantly improved, allowing them to deal a decisive blow to the enemy while consuming the enemy’s forces. It is through such tactics that the Tang army frequently achieved victories in open-field battles despite being outnumbered.
3. On the campaign level, the large number of highly mobile cavalry significantly enriched the military strategies of the Tang dynasty. First, there was a widespread use of elite cavalry for deep incursions into enemy territory, characterized by concentrating elite cavalry to achieve victory through sudden attacks. In the fourth year of Zhenguan (630), during the campaign against the Eastern Turkic Khan Ke Li, this tactic was employed, where Li Jing first “led three thousand elite cavalry” to raid Dingxiang, and then “selected ten thousand elite cavalry, carrying supplies for twenty days” to launch a surprise attack on Yanshan. Li Jinxi proposed that the Tang dynasty was able to have elite cavalry because, on one hand, the Turkic cavalry participated directly, and on the other, they learned the tactics of elite cavalry from the Turkic people. After the fourth year of Zhenguan, the extensive application of this tactic was undoubtedly a crucial factor enabled by the inclusion of steppe cavalry. At least after the fourth year of Zhenguan, the inclusion of Turkic cavalry allowed the Tang army to employ surprise attacks as a common military method. In the ninth year of Zhenguan, the Tang army attacked Tuyuhun, where the “old Tang Book: Biography of Hou Junchi” records:
When the army arrived at Shanzhou, Junchi said to Jing: “The main force has arrived, and the enemy has not yet fled. It is advisable to select elite troops for a rapid advance, as they will not expect it, and there will surely be great gains. If this strategy fails, they will likely retreat far away, and the mountains will block our pursuit, making it difficult to attack.” Jing agreed to his plan, and thus selected elite troops to advance deeply. Daozong pursued the enemy forces and defeated them.
Li Jing listened to Hou Junchi’s advice, dispatching elite cavalry deep into enemy territory, defeating the Tuyuhun Khan Fu Yun. After this, Li Jing “divided the soldiers and horses into two paths to advance together,” covering over two thousand miles and pacifying Tuyuhun. It is noteworthy that this campaign involved cooperation from Turkic and Qibi cavalry, which was a significant guarantee for the Tang army’s ability to advance deeply into enemy territory. In the twenty-third year of Zhenguan, Gao Kan led Uighur troops to attack Chebi Khan, and upon reaching Ashi Mountain, Chebi Khan fled, while Gao Kan “led elite cavalry to pursue Chebi and captured him.” In the second year of Xianqing, Su Dingfang defeated the Western Turkic coalition, causing Ashina Helu to flee. “Dingfang ordered his deputy commander, Xiao Siyie, and Uighur troops to pursue northward,” capturing Helu. In the fourth year of Xianqing, Su Dingfang campaigned against the Western Turkic Duoman, “selecting ten thousand elite soldiers and three thousand cavalry to attack them, marching three hundred miles day and night to reach their location.” These are all classic examples of elite cavalry raids.
Secondly, the steppe cavalry often formed their own marching units, advancing separately with other troops, coordinating to complete the campaign. When the Tang army organized large-scale military expeditions, they often divided into different chief commanders, advancing from multiple routes. When a significant number of steppe cavalry were involved, the Tang army would organize the steppe cavalry into one or more marching units according to the needs of the campaign to achieve specific strategic goals. For example, in the second year of Xianqing, during the battle against Ashina Helu, besides the aforementioned Su Dingfang leading Uighur elite cavalry to advance from the northern route, the surrendered Western Turkic leaders Ashina Buzhen and Ashina Mishi acted as pacification envoys along the Jinshan route. This route was likely traversing the Tianshan region, where the Western Turkic tribes were present, and at that time, they were “waiting for the arrival of over ten thousand households to submit,” which indeed played a pacifying role. Subsequently, the two armies met at the Double Rivers and defeated Helu. In the twentieth year of Zhenguan, when attacking Xue Yantuo, Qibi Helu and others also “led their respective troops to split routes and advance together.” This became a common strategy for the Tang army.
4. On the grand strategy level, leveraging the military advantages accumulated at the technical, tactical, and campaign levels, the early Tang dynasty tended to adopt a proactive offensive strategy in dealing with border issues. Tang Changru pointed out that the Tang dynasty had two strategies in dealing with foreign tribes: “peace” and “war,” with the “war” strategy further divided into “attack” and “defense.” In the early Tang, an offensive strategy was adopted, until the reign of Gaozong in the Yifeng era, when it was compelled to shift towards a defensive strategy. In fact, the Tang dynasty’s strategy also underwent a transition from passive defense to proactive offense. During the Wude era, the Turkic forces frequently invaded the northern regions of the Tang dynasty, and by the ninth year of Wude, they even threatened the Weishui River, forcing the Tang to adopt a defensive stance. It was not until the fourth year of Zhenguan that they decisively defeated the Eastern Turkic, marking the beginning of the Tang dynasty’s military strategy of proactive engagement in managing the surrounding territories. It can be seen that the Tang dynasty adopted an offensive strategy during the period when the “south and north crossing” political pattern was formed, achieving significant victories through proactive campaigns. As previously mentioned, during the reign of Taizong, they conquered Tuyuhun, Gaochang, Kucha, and Xue Yantuo, while during Gaozong’s reign, they defeated the Western Turkic, Chebi Khan, and Goguryeo through continuous offensives.
Sun Jiming pointed out that maintaining an offensive strategy allowed for the concentration of various troops, including the regular army, recruited soldiers, and foreign troops, “forming large-scale field armies to create powerful strike forces, ensuring the initiative in warfare.” The advantage of this strategy lies in resolving battles outside the territory within a short time, minimizing the impact on social and economic conditions. In the early Tang dynasty’s “south and north crossing” political pattern, the large-scale mobilization of Turkic, Uighur, and other steppe cavalry undoubtedly provided the Tang army with greater military advantages when waging campaigns against surrounding forces. Of course, from the perspective of grand strategy, the Tang dynasty’s strategic decisions must comprehensively consider political, economic, social, and cultural factors, but at least from a military standpoint, the military advantages of combining agriculture and pastoralism provided a crucial condition for the early Tang’s offensive strategy.
The above summarizes the military strategy combining agriculture and pastoralism that the Tang dynasty achieved under the “south and north crossing” pattern. The implementation of this strategy allowed the Tang dynasty to achieve a series of military victories shortly after its establishment, fundamentally laying the groundwork for the border situation during the Tang dynasty. It is worth reiterating that the key element in forming this military strategy and achieving military results was not simply the replacement of the regular army with foreign troops, but rather the effective combination of steppe cavalry with the Central Plains regular army and recruited soldiers. In the second year of Yonghui, when the Tang dynasty first attacked Ashina Helu, Luo Hongyi had already suggested mobilizing the nomadic tribes in the Tianshan region to cooperate with the main army, stating that “the barbarian forces rely on Tang troops as wings; now the Hu cavalry advance in front, and Tang troops follow closely behind, Helu is doomed.” This reflects the combat tendency at the time, which was not to rely primarily on foreign troops to attack other steppe forces but rather to have Han and foreign troops support each other, thus forming a strategic advantage. In summary, under the political pattern of “south and north crossing,” the Tang dynasty achieved infantry-cavalry cooperation between the Central Plains and the steppe, overcoming the military limitations arising from their differing modes of production, combining their respective strengths to form a military strategy that integrated agriculture and pastoralism.
3. The Crisis and Continuation of the Military Strategy of Agriculture and Pastoralism
The military strategy combining agriculture and pastoralism in the early Tang dynasty primarily involved the cooperative combat of the regular army, recruited soldiers, and steppe cavalry from the Turkic and Uighur tribes. However, during the reign of Gaozong, the political pattern of the Tang dynasty’s “south and north crossing” began to show instability and gradually collapsed, creating significant difficulties for the Tang dynasty in maintaining its military strategy of combining agriculture and pastoralism.
In the first year of Longshuo, the Uighur leader Polun, who had fought alongside the Tang army, died, and his nephew Bisuduo led the Uighurs, Tongluo, and Pugu tribes to rebel. The Tang dynasty commanded Zheng Rentai to deploy troops against the Tiele. The historical records do not mention the reasons for the sudden break between the Uighurs and the Tang dynasty; it may be due to Bisuduo’s different political stance compared to his predecessor, or it could be related to the excessive mobilization of Uighur cavalry by the Tang dynasty. As can be seen from the previous table, after the twenty-first year of Zhenguan, the Uighurs clearly participated in suppressing Chebi Khan, the three campaigns against Ashina Helu, and the eastern expedition against Goguryeo, not only frequently deploying troops but also in large numbers, which may have exceeded the capacity of the Uighur and other Tiele tribes. Regardless, the political pattern of “south and north crossing” began to show cracks. Although Zheng Rentai quelled this incident, the Tang army “executed those who had surrendered, causing the captured to scatter, neglecting the soldiers and not accounting for supplies.” After Longshuo, subsequent historical records do not mention the Uighur cavalry participating in battles, or the Tang dynasty may have been unable to rely on them on a large scale due to concerns about the Tiele tribes. More seriously for the Tang dynasty was the rebellion of Ashide Wenfu of the Turkic in the first year of the Diao Lu, and in the first year of Yongchun (682), Ashina Guduo and others revolted again, leading to the re-establishment of the Turkic Khanate, and the northern Tiele tribes subsequently breaking away from the control of the Tang dynasty, resulting in the collapse of the political pattern of “south and north crossing.”
From the first year of Longshuo to the first year of Diao Lu, this period coincided with a tense phase of the Tang dynasty’s military operations on both the eastern and western fronts. The Tang dynasty only conquered Goguryeo in the first year of Zongzhang and established the Andong Protectorate in Pyongyang, but soon after, the remnants of Goguryeo launched two rebellions, and in the first year of Shangyuan (674), Silla occupied the territory of Baekje. The Tang dynasty was compelled to gradually abandon its efforts on the Korean Peninsula, moving the Andong Protectorate to the Liaodong ancient city (now Liaoyang, Liaoning) in the third year of Shangyuan, and again to Xincheng (now Beigao Mountain, Fushun) in the second year of Yifeng. To the west, the powerful rise of Tubo began to invade the western regions controlled by the Tang dynasty. Gaozong originally planned to continue the previous strategy, adopting an offensive strategy against Tubo, but suffered a devastating defeat at Dafei River, which was the most significant military loss since the establishment of the Tang dynasty. In the third year of Yifeng, the Tang dynasty organized another military expedition against Tubo, “dispatching General Jinwu, Cao Huaishun, and others to recruit fierce warriors from Henan and the north, regardless of their status as commoners or officials.” The term “fierce warriors” likely refers to the later Jianren, which were recruited soldiers. This indicates that the Tang dynasty began to require more troops to complete military tasks. During Gaozong’s reign, the Tang dynasty’s military grand strategy underwent significant adjustments, shifting from strategic offense to strategic defense, which also prompted a series of military system changes, including the rise of border military towns. It should not be overlooked that the end of the political pattern of “south and north crossing” had a crucial impact on the Tang dynasty’s military; without the ability to directly mobilize a large number of cavalry from the northern steppes, the Tang army found it challenging to accumulate tactical and strategic advantages over their opponents, making it difficult to maintain a high win rate in large-scale open-field battles, which was one of the important factors behind the shift in grand strategy.
Although after Gaozong’s reign, the military strategy of combining agriculture and pastoralism could not exert the significant advantages of the early Tang dynasty, it still continued and formed a military tradition. After the first year of Diao Lu, the Turkic and Uighur tribes active in the northern steppes largely broke away from the control of the Tang dynasty, but there remained a considerable number of steppe tribes adhering to the Tang dynasty in the northern border regions. The “Geographical Records of the Yuanhe Prefectures and Counties” states: “In the first year of Diao Lu, six prefectures including Lu, Li, Han, Sai, Yi, and Qi were established in the southern borders of Lingzhou to house the surrendered Turkic households, which were referred to as ‘Six Hu Prefectures’ by contemporary people.” This indicates that at the beginning of the Turkic “rebellion,” the Tang dynasty had already settled the remaining Turkic tribes that adhered to them in the Lingzhou area, establishing prefectures to govern them. These so-called “Turkic surrender households” were mostly Turkified Sogdian people, skilled in animal husbandry and cavalry. In the first year of the reign of Wu Zetian (690), she ordered, “To mobilize the elite troops of Hu from the regions of Hedong and Six Hu Prefectures and send them all to the camp.” In the Hexi region, some affiliated steppe tribes also migrated to the Gansu and Liangzhou areas due to invasions by the Turkic people. During the Wu Zhou period, due to invasions from the Turkic, some members of the Uighur, Qibi, and other tribes migrated to the Hexi region. In the western regions, the Western Turkic tribe of Wuduo and others maintained close relations with the Tang dynasty most of the time. The leader of the Western Turkic Hu Lu Wu, Ashina Zhongjie, participated in the military operations to recover the Four Towns in the third year of Changshou (694). Ashina Xian gained a position as the Northern Court’s governor and frequently led Tang armies to campaign, with many steppe cavalry in his forces. For instance, when the Tang dynasty planned to send “three surnamed Qibi troops with Ashina Xian to attack the Four Towns,” they were intended to attack together with the cavalry.
During the early years of Tang Xuanzong, the internal strife within the Turkic tribes led the Tiele and Khitan tribes to begin aligning with the Tang dynasty, with even core members of the Turkic Khanate, such as Motekin and Ashina Biji, leading their tribes to submit to the Tang. These steppe tribes adhered to the border military towns and played significant military roles as cavalry.
After the reign of Gaozong in the Yifeng era, although the grand strategy of the Tang dynasty focused more on the military town defense system, the military strategy of combining agriculture and pastoralism overall continued. In terms of tactics, the methods of infantry formations and cavalry victories remained common. In the twelfth year of Tianbao (753), Gao Xianzhi led foreign and Han troops to encounter the army of the Da Shi at Talas (now near Zhambyl, Kazakhstan), where the Tang army held their ground for five days despite being outnumbered, but ultimately suffered a defeat when the cavalry of the Geluoluo tribe turned against them. At that time, the Tang army likely still employed infantry-cavalry cooperative tactics. The battle process of the Tang army’s recovery of the two capitals during the An Lushan Rebellion illustrates the reliance on steppe cavalry. As mentioned earlier, the rebel forces included elite cavalry from the Tongluo tribe, while the official army repeatedly borrowed troops from the Uighurs to quell the rebellion. The Uighur cavalry that aided the Tang in recovering the two capitals numbered only around five thousand but played a crucial role, one important reason being that they served as a significant support for the Tang army in leveraging the military strategy of combining agriculture and pastoralism, allowing them to cooperate and maximize their strengths.
4. Conclusion
The period from the Wei and Jin dynasties to the Sui and Tang dynasties was an era of great exchange and integration between agricultural and nomadic cultures, with “Huaization” and “Hanization” becoming classic topics in the study of medieval history. Chen Yinke proposed that “the entire history of the Northern Dynasties concerning the Hu and Han issues is essentially a matter of Huization and Hanization,” and that the issues of ethnicity and culture were “the key to the history of the Li-Tang era, which should not be overlooked by historians of the Tang dynasty.” Subsequently, numerous works have examined various details of Tang dynasty “Huaization” from ethnic and cultural perspectives, also involving the dominant tendencies of “Huaization” and “Hanization.” On the other hand, the interaction between the Hu and Han has become an important perspective in studying the politics and national structure of the Tang dynasty.
However, if we examine this issue from a military perspective, we find that the agricultural-pastoral interaction in military strategy presents a unique developmental path. The most critical factor is that the military traditions of agricultural and pastoral regimes are deeply rooted in different modes of production and lifestyles, with nomadic practices being more conducive to continuously providing high-quality warhorses and cavalry, while agricultural practices are more advantageous for cultivating organized and disciplined infantry. Against the backdrop of Hu-Han exchanges and integration since the Wei and Jin dynasties, both the steppe powers and the Central Plains dynasty showed a tendency to learn from each other’s military strengths, but the differences in production methods limited the degree of mutual borrowing. The early Tang dynasty achieved an unprecedented political pattern of “south and north crossing”, with a large number of Turkic and Uighur cavalry entering the Tang military system, greatly enhancing the military strength of the Tang dynasty in terms of technology, tactics, campaigns, and forming a military strategy that integrated agriculture and pastoralism, leading to a series of victories in wars against surrounding forces. However, following the end of the political pattern of “south and north crossing” after Gaozong’s reign, the ideal combat methods combining the Central Plains army with the Turkic and Uighur forces came to an end. Nevertheless, until the An Lushan Rebellion, the Tang dynasty could still utilize the affiliated steppe tribes on the borders to continue the military strategy of combining agriculture and pastoralism, establishing it as a military tradition.
Through examining the formation and development of the military strategy of combining agriculture and pastoralism in the Tang dynasty, we find that beyond the traditional contexts of “Huaization” and “Hanization,” a perspective of Hu-Han integration can better describe the agricultural-pastoral interactions in military fields. Undoubtedly, the extensive Hu-Han integration during the Wei, Jin, and Sui-Tang periods was a significant factor in shaping the strong national power and splendid culture of the Tang dynasty, but this historical process was not achieved solely through “Huaization”; rather, it required the combination of each civilization’s strengths amid their collisions to form new driving forces for development.
[Editor: Jia Yi]
The original article was published in “Ethnic Studies”, 2022, Issue 6. Annotations and references have been omitted.For citations, please refer to the published version of the journal.Click the “Read Original” at the end of the article to download the full PDF.