What’s So Great About Japan’s Semiconductors?

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Japan’s semiconductor industry is no longer as powerful as it was in the 1980s, but its ambitions remain. On April 25, the Japanese government provided an additional subsidy of 260 billion yen to the domestic semiconductor company Rapidus, bringing the total investment to 330 billion yen to focus on 2nm process technology[1]. Additionally, the country has recently followed the United States in imposing export controls on 23 types of semiconductor equipment.
So, what is Japan capable of now, and why is it eager to restrict the Chinese semiconductor industry? What is the real situation in various fields, and what insights can it provide for the domestic semiconductor industry?
What's So Great About Japan's Semiconductors?

From Low-Price Dumping to a Fall from Grace

In various fields such as textiles, steel, color TVs, automobiles, and semiconductors, Japan once showed strong international competitiveness, putting pressure on the United States and leading to multiple trade frictions[2]. This was particularly prominent in the history of Japan’s semiconductor development, which can be divided into several periods: following and surpassing, flourishing and declining, and reshaping advantages.[3]
Japan’s semiconductor industry started very early, passing the Industrial Cooperation Act in 1951. At that time, transistors had been around for twenty years, and countries around the world were exploring more miniaturized electronic circuits. It was not until 1958 when Jack Kilby invented the integrated circuit that the industry truly got on track[4]. During this period, Japan’s semiconductor development always lagged behind the United States, and real development began with post-war economic recovery.
In the 1960s, “buying, buying, buying” was synonymous with Japanese companies. In 1953, Sony introduced transistor technology patents from Westinghouse Electric in the United States, reducing the cost of producing a transistor from $11 to $0.5 by 1958; in 1959, companies like Sony, NEC, Sanyo, and Toshiba produced 86.5 million transistors in one year, surpassing the United States[3]; in 1962, Nippon Electric purchased planar photolithography technology from Fairchild in the U.S. At that time, workers in Tokyo’s electronics factories earned less than $30 a month, while their American counterparts earned as much as $380. The low labor costs combined with the purchased technology allowed Japan’s semiconductor development to progress astonishingly.[5]
However, simply buying technology to produce chips could never meet market demand. In the early 1970s, Japan’s computer industry lagged behind the U.S. by more than ten years. Perhaps Japan realized that this approach could not form a strong competition against American companies, so it shifted its focus to VLSI (Very Large Scale Integration). Simply put, the larger the scale of integrated circuits, the more components can be accommodated in the same area, and the more advanced the technology becomes.
How to achieve VLSI? It required a significant financial investment. From 1970 to 1977, the proportion of R&D funding for semiconductor manufacturing equipment in Japan rose from 2% to 26%[6]. Among these investments, a crucial one occurred in 1976 when the Japanese government raised 72 billion yen to guide six major companies—Hitachi, Nippon Electric, Fujitsu, Mitsubishi, Toshiba, and NEC—to implement the VLSI plan, focusing on tackling DRAM (Dynamic Random Access Memory). Meanwhile, two other laboratories (CDL and NTIS) conducted forward-looking applied research in smaller niche markets. In just four years, the VLSI Research Association applied for 1,000 patents, of which 601 were granted[7], and developed electron beam lithography (EBL) technology, paving the way for semiconductor manufacturing, which was later commercialized by ASML, Nikon, and Canon.
With continuous investment in VLSI research, Japan almost simultaneously launched the 64K DRAM at the end of the 1970s alongside the United States. To capture a larger market share, Japan began aggressive price promotions, causing severe shocks in the global semiconductor market. For instance, Japan reduced the price of 64K DRAM from $28 to $6 within a year.[7]
Market data never lies. In the early 1980s, the U.S. was undoubtedly surpassed by Japan’s low-price dumping strategy, and Japan’s position continued to rise. In 1984, Japan was the first to develop 1MB DRAM; in 1986, Japan’s market share in memory reached as high as 65%, while the U.S. only had 30%; by 1988, Japan accounted for 51% of global semiconductor sales[6]. Looking at the sales figures of companies during that time, from 1980 to 1988, NEC’s annual sales rose from $3.8 billion to $21.9 billion, while U.S. GTE’s sales increased from $9.98 billion to $16.46 billion, with Japan’s growth rate significantly outpacing that of the U.S.
This situation caused anxious Americans to take action, viewing Japan as their biggest competitor.
In 1985, the American Semiconductor Industry Association imposed a 100% punitive tariff on $300 million worth of chips exported from Japan, citing abnormal equipment investments in Japan’s semiconductor industry.
In 1986, Intel and several other semiconductor companies jointly pushed the government to establish the five-year U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Agreement, implementing restrictive import quotas, high tariffs, and limiting U.S. companies from exporting chip equipment and materials to Japan, among other sanctions. Japan, fearing complete exclusion from the market by the U.S., made concessions.
In 1987, the U.S. established the Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology Consortium (SEMATECH) to increase investment in semiconductors.
In 1991, the renewed U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Agreement explicitly required that chips produced in the U.S. must have a 20% market share in Japan[8]. However, the Japanese government gradually weakened its support for the semiconductor industry, and the advantages accumulated over the years were gradually eroded.[9]
In the 1990s, the semiconductor industry was no longer confined to the IDM (Integrated Device Manufacturer) business model, and began to diversify into highly specialized companies such as Foundry and Fabless. TSMC was established in 1987 as the first pure-play foundry company. During this period, the Japanese government believed that companies should not repeatedly invest in building manufacturing infrastructure, but should instead shift more capacity to the design end.
In 2001, Japan, along with 11 companies, invested over $300 million to establish the Japan Semiconductor Foundry, aiming to promote the transition of the Japanese semiconductor industry from IDM to Fabless. Although this initiative initially benefited the semiconductor industry, it weakened the diversity of manufacturers, making it difficult for the industry structure to adapt to future competitive environments. Additionally, at that time, Japanese companies significantly reduced R&D investment, leading to a series of chain reactions. By 2005, the government called for Hitachi, Toshiba, and Renesas to jointly establish a 65nm factory, but eventually, all three companies agreed that sharing a factory was not commercially viable, and the proposal was abandoned in 2006.[6]
Since then, Japan’s semiconductor industry has been in a state of decline. In March 2012, Panasonic, Sony, and Sharp collectively reported losses exceeding 1.6 trillion yen[10]. In the same year, Japan’s proud memory manufacturers Elpida and automotive semiconductor giant Renesas fell into operational crises one after another.
From a market ranking perspective, in 1985, the top 10 Japanese companies held 60% of the global market share, but by 2019, the U.S. accounted for over 55% of the global IC (integrated circuit) market sales, Korean companies accounted for 21%, while Japanese companies only held 6%, with none making it to the top 10 global semiconductor companies[2].
Even now, while Japan still holds an absolute say in upstream materials and equipment, it only accounts for 10% of the global semiconductor market share.[11]
What's So Great About Japan's Semiconductors?

Top 10 Semiconductor Manufacturers and Their Value Changes[2]

In the past decade, the tables have turned. Although Japan once enjoyed great glory, semiconductors have now become a political tool for Japan. In 2019, Japan restricted the export of three semiconductor process materials—polyimide, photoresist, and high-purity hydrogen fluoride—to South Korea, which depended on Japan for 93.7%, 91.9%, and 43.9% of these materials, respectively[12], disrupting South Korea’s semiconductor industry process until both sides reached a reconciliation in 2023.[13]
In March 2023, Japan announced it would begin imposing export controls on six categories of 23 types of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment (below 14nm to 10nm processes) starting in July, affecting dozens of Japanese companies such as Tokyo Electron, SCREEN, and Nikon involved in chip cleaning, deposition, photolithography, and etching.[14]
Japan has not given up; it still dreams of returning to its peak. To achieve this goal, Japan has introduced two measures in the past two years: on one hand, allowing TSMC to enter Japan, with a semiconductor subsidy of 774 billion yen announced in 2021, of which 614 billion yen will support TSMC’s Kumamoto plant and Kioxia’s Yokkaichi plant; on the other hand, forming Rapidus with eight major Japanese companies including Denso, Sony, NTT, NEC, SoftBank, Kioxia, and Mitsubishi UFJ Bank to tackle the latest 2nm and 1nm process technologies. To date, Japan’s planned subsidy scale for semiconductor development has reached 2 trillion yen.[15]
Although Japan is now investing heavily in semiconductors, its effectiveness remains uncertain. It should be noted that under geopolitical friction, the significance of semiconductors has become prominent; failing to subsidize semiconductors now will only make Japan’s economic prospects even bleaker.
What's So Great About Japan's Semiconductors?

Living Off Past Glory in Materials and Equipment

With a tumultuous history and having missed the best opportunity to dominate the market, Japan’s semiconductor industry still relies on niche areas.
Currently, Japan, which lags in manufacturing, is focusing more on smaller, lower-margin markets, but with higher technical difficulty in materials and equipment. Due to the high degree of specialization in these fields and the high technical requirements, large semiconductor companies rarely venture into them, creating a unique monopolistic wall for Japan that seems to be surviving in a narrow space.[16]
CSET data shows that in 2021, Japan’s market share in EDA, IP cores, design, Fab (foundry), and ATP (assembly test and packaging) was all less than or equal to 10%, indicating weak competitiveness in these areas, while in upstream wafers, manufacturing equipment, and testing equipment, Japan remains globally leading[17].
Additionally, data shows that for a long time, Japan’s equipment market share has accounted for nearly 40% of the global market, while the materials market has accounted for nearly 60%[18].
What's So Great About Japan's Semiconductors?

The Global Semiconductor Market Pattern by Field[17]

The materials involved in wafer manufacturing include silicon wafers (38%), photomasks (13%), electronic special gases (13%), CMP materials (13%), photoresists (12%), wet chemicals (5%), and target materials (2%). Japanese companies have achieved full coverage of semiconductor materials.
  • Silicon wafers: High investment in production lines, high depreciation costs, volatile gross profit margins, and many long-term supply agreements (LTA). Shin-Etsu Chemical and Sumco together have maintained a market share of over 50%;[19]
  • Photomasks: 45nm is a watershed; wafer fabs with processes more advanced than 45nm generally produce their own photomasks, while mature processes tend to opt for third-party photomask products for better cost. DNP, Toppan Photomask, and Hoya are three Japanese companies with significant market dominance, with SKE holding a 20.2% market share in photomasks for flat-panel displays;[20]
  • Electronic special gases: These gases require extremely high purity. Taiyo Nippon Sanso holds 18% of the global market. In terms of electronic gases for semiconductor use in China, companies like Kanto Chemical, Central Glass, and Showa Denko exhibit strong dominance;[21]
  • CMP materials: In CMP polishing liquids, Hitachi Chemical and Fujimi together have maintained a market share of over 20%. In CMP polishing pads, U.S. DuPont has long held over 80% market share, while Japan’s Fujibo and JSR occupy single-digit shares;[22]
  • Photoresists: These are high-tech barrier materials, with complex processes and high purity requirements, and a certification cycle of 2-3 years. Tokyo Ohka Kogyo, JSR, Fujifilm, Shin-Etsu Chemical, and Sumitomo Chemical are mainstream manufacturers, and currently, only Japanese companies can produce EUV photoresists besides U.S. DuPont;[23]
  • Wet chemicals: These are used in various downstream applications, have high technical barriers, rapid updates, strong functionality, and strong added value. Japanese companies hold 27% of the global market share, including Kanto Chemical, Mitsubishi Chemical, Kyoto Chemical, and Sumitomo Chemical;[24]
  • Target materials: Among all industries, the target materials for semiconductors have the highest purity requirements. Nippon Mining’s market share reaches 30%, while Tosoh’s market share is 20%. In 2021, Japan’s target materials accounted for 16% of the semiconductor capacity in mainland China.[25]
From the market perspective, the demand for semiconductor materials is strong, but the future is highly uncertain, and related companies may experience shocks. TechCet data shows that in 2022, the semiconductor materials market was approximately $66 billion, with an 8% increase in demand compared to 2021. The sub-markets for CMP polishing pads, special gases, precursor materials, and SOI wafers grew by double digits year-on-year. In 2023, the decline in memory utilization rates will suppress markets for precursor materials, special gases, cleaning chemicals, and capacitor materials, while advanced process nodes below 10nm will be the main growth point for material production in 2023.[26]

What's So Great About Japan's Semiconductors?

Representative Companies and Current Status of Japanese Semiconductor Materials (Data are the most recent retrievable data)[27]~[36], Table compiled by Guokey Hard Technology
In the chip manufacturing process, the involved manufacturing equipment includes thin film deposition equipment (27%), etching equipment (22%), measurement equipment (13%), photolithography machines (20%), CMP equipment (4%), cleaning equipment (4%), coating and developing machines (3%), thermal treatment equipment (3%), ion implantation equipment (3%), and stripping equipment (1%)[37], with Japan basically mastering all equipment, while domestic equipment only accounts for 17.2% of the domestic market.[38]
For example, Tokyo Electron (TEL) is a versatile player, mastering most semiconductor manufacturing equipment and holding a high market share. Nikon and Canon are among the few companies, besides ASML, that can produce advanced photolithography machines. Advantest, Hitachi High-Tech, and Lasertec have strong market dominance in testing and measurement equipment, while Tokyo Precision, DISCO’s wafer cutting equipment also holds a strong position in the market.

What's So Great About Japan's Semiconductors?

Representative Companies and Current Status of Japanese Semiconductor Equipment (Data are the most recent retrievable data)[39]~[47], Table compiled by Guokey Hard Technology
From the market data, in 2022, Japanese companies accounted for about 30% of the global semiconductor equipment market share[48]. Tech Insights data shows that in 2021, the total sales of Japanese semiconductor equipment reached 3.4 trillion yen, with Tokyo Electron (TEL) ranking third, Advantest sixth, SCREEN seventh, Kokusai Electric ninth, Hitachi High-Tech twelfth, Canon fourteenth, and DISCO fifteenth.[49]
The global semiconductor equipment market share is steadily growing, but Japanese companies are highly dependent on the Chinese market. SEMI reports show that in 2022, the total shipment value of global semiconductor manufacturing equipment increased by 5% compared to $102.6 billion in 2021, reaching a historical high of $107.6 billion[50]. In 2022, Japan’s exports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment to mainland China exceeded 820 billion yen, making China the largest export destination for Japanese companies, accounting for 31% of their total exports.[51]
What's So Great About Japan's Semiconductors?

Top 15 Semiconductor Equipment Suppliers in 2021[49]

In the midstream IC sector, Japanese companies are more adept at manufacturing passive components, which mostly rely on material technology advantages, such as aluminum electrolytic capacitors, ceramic capacitors, etc.
Moreover, while the coverage of domestic chips is small and the number of companies is limited, Japan still holds advantages in specific fields. For instance, Sony ranks first in the world in image sensor chips, while Renesas Electronics, formed by the merger of NEC, Hitachi’s semiconductor division, and Mitsubishi Electric’s semiconductor division, has a global leading advantage in automotive semiconductors. Kioxia is one of the top six NAND Flash manufacturers globally.[52]
What's So Great About Japan's Semiconductors?

Major IC Companies in Japan, Table compiled by Guokey Hard Technology

In addition to the aforementioned companies, Japan also has many invisible champions. Ferrotec is a Japanese semiconductor equipment and material supplier, with a 60% market share in its parts cleaning business and a 40% market share in its semiconductor precision quartz business in China. Its thermoelectric semiconductor coolers, vacuum seals, power semiconductor substrates, semiconductor quartz products, precision ceramics, probe boards for cutting ceramics, and silicon fusion products have global market shares of 35%, 65%, 10%, 15%, 11%, 90%, and 90%, respectively[53]; Ajinomoto supplies 99% of the global ABF substrate-related materials[15]. Additionally, Asahi Kasei, IBIDEN, Mitsui Chemicals, Showa Denko, Shin-Etsu Chemical, Nippon Electric Glass, and Shibaura are also important semiconductor companies.[54]
What's So Great About Japan's Semiconductors?

Domestic Chips Should Not Follow Japan’s Old Path

Japan’s semiconductor industry, now in the shadows, will find it challenging to regain its former glory. Experts analyze that, given Japan’s current development situation, returning to the level of the 1980s would require an investment of at least $78 billion to make up for more than 20 years of investment shortfalls, and there is no other way out.[55]

However, contrary to this, Japanese companies have always been very conservative, especially in semiconductors. Many companies have experienced severe failures, so even when receiving a large number of orders, they are reluctant to expand production, instead pursuing the goal of becoming “small and beautiful” companies.[56]

With the current downward trend in overall semiconductor demand, Japanese companies’ advantages in equipment and materials have begun to gradually weaken, and relying solely on past glories is no longer feasible. The Semiconductor Equipment Association of Japan (SEAJ) data shows that as of February 2023, Japan’s semiconductor equipment sales have declined for five consecutive months, and SEAJ predicts that Japan’s semiconductor equipment sales will drop to nearly 3.5 trillion yen this year, a decline of 5%, marking the first decline in four years.[57]

Moreover, the operational efficiency of Japanese companies has gradually declined. In the 2022 IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, Japan’s overall competitiveness dropped from 25th in 2018 to 34th (out of 63 countries and regions). Over the past 20 years, Japanese companies’ rankings in international competitiveness have fallen from the 20s to the 30s, with operational efficiency indicators all ranking below 40.[58]

What's So Great About Japan's Semiconductors?

Japan’s World Competitiveness Related Data[58]

In fact, Japan’s past predicament is very similar to that of domestic semiconductors: a short-term rise followed by unreasonable suppression by the U.S. Although we cannot avoid foreign restrictions from the source, we can learn from the experience:

  • Japan lacked sensitivity to changes in production models, stubbornly adhering to a vertical production model in R&D and production, making it difficult to meet market demand. Over time, the market eliminated these Japanese products;[59]

  • Japan failed to seize market trends, not only neglecting the importance of microprocessors (CPUs), cellular mobile technology, and smartphones but also facing bottlenecks in the Japanese-style technology supremacy, leading to an increasing inability of Japanese companies to keep pace with market developments;[9]

  • Japan’s industrial chain system lacks resilience, with insufficient high-end process manufacturing capabilities, only able to produce low-end products at 40nm, creating a duality paradox with upstream competitive advantages;[3]

  • Development through closed-door methods cannot produce advanced technology; only “bringing in and going out” can enhance competitiveness;

  • The clause in the U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Agreement stating that “foreign products must account for 20% of the Japanese market share” became a lethal weapon for the U.S., continually demanding Japan to open its market, and China should also take this as a warning, recognizing the harm of related clauses and remaining vigilant against U.S. schemes.[59]

Regarding Japan’s abuse of export control measures, the China Semiconductor Industry Association stated that the semiconductor industries of China and Japan are interdependent and promote each other. China has advantages in upstream raw materials, components, and packaging, while Japan has strengths in semiconductor equipment, materials, specific semiconductor products, and hardware integration. Implementing controls will only further weaken Japanese companies’ competitiveness in the international market.[60]

Regardless, Japan’s days of living off past glories are long gone, and domestic semiconductors should seek new strategies.

What's So Great About Japan's Semiconductors?

References：

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[49] Tech Insights: 2021 Top Semiconductor Equipment Suppliers. https://www.techinsights.com/blog/2021-top-semiconductor-equipment-suppliers

[50] SEMI: The Global Semiconductor Equipment Shipment Value Reached $107.6 Billion in 2022, Setting a New Historical High. 2023.4.13. https://www.semi.org.cn/site/semi/article/c727543d4e384782936f89b98b89ff4b.html

[51] Global Times: Various Sectors in Japan Calculate the Consequences of the Semiconductor “Ban”. 2023.4.3. https://tech.huanqiu.com/article/4CKyMHMgFQh

[52] Economic Reference Daily: Japan’s Semiconductor Industry: Glory No More, Advantages Still Exist. 2021.9.6. http://www.jjckb.cn/2021-09/06/c_1310170031.htm

[53] Jingkai Capital: [Jingkai Capital | Industry Observation] Revealing the Invisible Champions of Global Semiconductor Equipment and Materials: Japan’s Ferrotec | Zhongxin Wafer. 2021.5.31. https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/vYBBrOssS_ndgJx-LSu2-g

[54] Semiconductor Industry Observation: Japan’s Semiconductor Invisible Champions. 2021.6.23. https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/19vdcWjQMlHq6hfB8Dgimw

[55] Wall Street Journal: Japan Once Led the World in Microchips. Now, It’s Racing to Catch Up. 2022.8.4. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/04/business/japan-semiconductors-chips.html

[56] Jimi Network: Japan Plans to Restrict Photoresist Exports to China? Domestic Investors Panic. 2023.3.10. https://www.laoyaoba.com/n/851895

[57] Jimi Network: Japan’s Semiconductor Equipment Sales Decline for Five Consecutive Months. 2023.4.10. https://www.laoyaoba.com/n/856123

[58] IMD: https://wwwcontent.imd.org/globalassets/wcc/docs/wco/pdfs/countries-landing-page/JP.pdf

[59] Li Haodong. The Development Gains and Losses of Japan’s Semiconductor Industry and Its Implications for China [J]. China Economic and Trade Guide (Theoretical Edition), 2018, (17): 16-19.

[60] China Semiconductor Industry Association: Regarding Japan’s Plan to Expand Export Controls on Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment, the China Semiconductor Industry Association Issues a Serious Statement. 2023.4.28. https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/LkSWvzPj3GNJ6M5j8dY-4A

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