In the summer of 2025, global chip giant NVIDIA found itself in an unprecedented trust crisis—its H20 computing chip, specifically supplied for the Chinese market, was reported to have serious security issues, leading to discussions with the National Internet Information Office.
The fate of the H20 chip has been tumultuous: born in 2023 to circumvent U.S. sanctions, its performance was significantly reduced; in April of this year, the U.S. banned sales to China on the grounds of “national security”; on July 15, Jensen Huang announced that export licenses had been granted, but just 16 days later, he was called in for discussions due to security concerns.
This reflects the contradictory mindset of U.S. technology controls: wanting to profit from the Chinese market while simultaneously trying to “choke” it.
The U.S. obsession with chip security has a long history. In May 2025, the U.S. House of Representatives proposed the “Chip Security Act,” which requires verification of the location of regulated chips and remote control capabilities; in July, the White House released the “Artificial Intelligence Action Plan,” demanding that companies establish a “chip location verification mechanism.”
Experts confirm that NVIDIA’s computing chip’s “tracking and positioning” and “remote shutdown” technologies are already mature.
From a hardware perspective, the power management module of the H20 chip can embed a “remote shutdown” circuit; from a software perspective, CUDA can implement tracking, positioning, and file collection backdoor functions. If the H20 is pre-installed with backdoors, the consequences could be severe:
Geographic tracking: secretly transmitting server locations, exposing key data center coordinates.
Remote paralysis: instantly incapacitating AI cluster systems, potentially turning servers worth hundreds of millions into scrap metal.
Data theft: becoming a covert channel for stealing training data and model parameters.
NVIDIA denies the existence of backdoors, claiming that the chip design meets safety standards, but must submit credible technical proof within a limited time; otherwise, the H20 may be banned from sale. Since being called in for discussions on July 31, NVIDIA has emphasized chip safety in three responses, but actions are what matter.
The U.S. has a notorious track record regarding the installation of “backdoors.” In March 2025, Germany’s Bild reported that the F-35 fighter jet relies on U.S. systems, and without U.S. approval, its basic functions could be disabled, potentially preventing the aircraft from taking off.
In the 2013 “Prism” scandal, Snowden revealed that the U.S. monitored Chinese networks through Cisco routers, which were found to have pre-installed “backdoors.”
From the “Prism” scandal to the H20 “backdoor,” the “credibility deficit” of U.S. tech companies has intensified, with lawmakers even publicly demanding that exported chips be installed with “backdoors,” showing a blatant disregard for security.
In the face of risks, we should respond rationally. Professor Cui Fan from the University of International Business and Economics suggests that corporate users can clarify the security responsibilities of suppliers through commercial contracts, and if issues arise, the other party must bear substantial compensation.
Meanwhile, the domestic computing chip system is becoming increasingly mature. Recently, the A-share AI sector has rebounded strongly, and the Chinese AI chip market is experiencing explosive growth, with the market size expected to exceed $39 billion by 2025.
By 2025, the proportion of domestic chips in AI computing center procurement is expected to leap from 5% in 2022 to 40%, while NVIDIA’s market share in China has dropped from 95% to 50%. The H20 has now become a “hot potato,” with NVIDIA struggling to survive in the Sino-U.S. technology game.
The “backdoor” incident not only exposes technical risks but also reflects the strategic disorder of the U.S. amid anxiety over technological hegemony, binding enterprises to the chariot of geopolitical competition. The U.S. weaponizing chips has instead forced China to accelerate its process of achieving self-reliance and control.
In the long run, while technology can be embedded with backdoors, the global industrial chain is deeply integrated without backdoors. The outcome of this “chip war” does not hinge on the rise and fall of any single enterprise, but rather on who can build a more open, secure, and trustworthy technological ecosystem.
AI is one of the most important technologies in human history. Should the U.S. and China decouple and block each other, or open up and cooperate? Our stance is clear, and the world is watching closely to see how the U.S. will choose.