The “backdoor” issue concerning NVIDIA’s AI chips has sparked extensive discussions and controversies.
In July 2025, shortly after the lifting of restrictions on NVIDIA chips, relevant national departments issued a warning, advising the public and businesses to exercise caution when procuring foreign chips, alerting them to the potential “backdoor” risks that may exist within these chips. These chips could be deliberately implanted with backdoors, allowing foreign manufacturers to remotely control devices, posing threats to personal privacy and national security.
Despite NVIDIA’s repeated denials of any “backdoors” in its AI chips, a report by Reuters on August 13, citing sources, claimed that the U.S. has embedded tracking devices in AI chip shipments, which were used in servers from manufacturers like Dell and Super Micro that are equipped with NVIDIA and AMD chips. This report seems to confirm the existence of “technical backdoors” and significant security risks associated with U.S. AI chips.
Trackers Concealed Within Servers
Sources from the AI server supply chain indicated that they are aware of trackers being used in server shipments from Dell and Super Micro, which are equipped with NVIDIA and AMD chips.
According to these sources, this measure aims to detect whether AI chip shipments are being rerouted to countries and regions subject to U.S. export controls, particularly China. The trackers are typically concealed within the internal packaging or hardware of the servers and require disassembly to be discovered; in a few cases, trackers were found directly installed on the exterior of shipping boxes.
In a reported case from 2024, a batch of Dell servers equipped with NVIDIA chips not only had large trackers found on the shipping boxes but also smaller, more concealed tracking devices discovered inside the packaging and even within the equipment itself. Additionally, insiders stated they had seen photos and videos of chip distributors removing the trackers, with some large trackers being comparable in size to smartphones.
U.S. companies involved have declined to comment on the matter. Dell stated it was unaware of any government initiative to install trackers in its product shipments. Super Micro claimed it does not comment on security measures.
Currently, a major point of contention is whether the installation of these devices occurs without the knowledge of the relevant companies (such as NVIDIA and Dell), which raises concerns about violations of commercial privacy and international supply chain regulations.
U.S. Government Involvement in Such Actions
The U.S. holds a dominant position in the global AI chip supply chain and has long sought to slow China’s modernization efforts in military and other fields by restricting the export of chips and other technologies.
In recent years, the U.S. government has continuously tightened export controls to curb China’s technological development in the field of artificial intelligence. Notably, in October 2022, the U.S. began restricting the export of high-performance chips from manufacturers like NVIDIA and AMD to China to prevent advanced AI chips from reaching the country.
Insiders have indicated that the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) may be involved in such actions.
Although the U.S. has not explicitly authorized the installation of trackers in any export control regulations (such as the Export Administration Regulations – EAR), law enforcement agencies have cited the following procedures: first, administrative approval: the U.S. BIS or FBI initiates installation through internal approval; second, judicial authorization: applying for a tracking warrant from a federal judge, but without publicly disclosed court orders to substantiate this.
Additionally, it is worth mentioning that in 2024-2025, the U.S. Congress proposed two key bills attempting to legalize tracking. The “Chip Security Act” mandates that all exported AI chips must be embedded with geolocation verification modules for remote monitoring to prevent technology from flowing into specific countries or regions.
The other proposal is for chip location tracking. Some U.S. lawmakers have suggested adding “non-removable location backdoors” to high-end processors.
Despite some opposition within the U.S., particularly from the industry questioning the technical feasibility of the proposals and their violation of the neutrality principle in the global semiconductor supply chain, it seems that related actions have already been underway.
Severe Violations and International Impact
Currently, the U.S. BIS and FBI have declined to comment on specific actions, emphasizing only that they will use all investigative tools to combat illegal transshipments. The U.S. Department of Commerce has not responded to the allegations but acknowledged that it is “continuously strengthening export control compliance tools”.
This behavior by the U.S. government is viewed as an export control measure aimed at limiting the export of advanced chips to China to curb its technological development. However, this action has sparked discussions about “backdoors” and “trackers,” with reports even mentioning the embedding of spy codes and “backdoor” technologies in chips by the U.S.
There is no doubt that this move by the U.S. lacks any legitimacy. Even under U.S. domestic law, installing trackers without judicial authorization may violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against illegal searches. Under international law, it may contravene the WTO’s Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) regarding the “principle of non-discrimination”.
The U.S. shift from “controlling export destinations” to “monitoring real-time chip locations” reflects an emergency mechanism following the failure of its technological containment strategy. However, such covert actions may backfire, forcing China to accelerate domestic alternatives.
Although the U.S. attempts to legitimize this through legislation, the technical feasibility and international countermeasures will long constrain this strategy. The core contradiction lies in the incompatibility of national security objectives with global supply chain transparency. Future attention should focus on two evolving aspects: first, whether the U.S. will publicly disclose judicial authorization documents to prove procedural legitimacy; second, the feasibility of shifting tracking technology from “external installation” to “native embedding in chips”.
Editor: Jimmy.zhang
